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Several objectives guide this literature review.  Principally, it aims to shed light 
on the problems involved in attributing results within aid evaluation research. In doing 
so, it synthesizes the perspectives of 'frontline' and academic experts working within the 
field.  Drawing on prominent past and contemporary writing, the first part of the review 
provides a brief, 'purposive' history of evaluation research generally, and 'aid evaluation' 
specifically.  This helps to illustrate the dynamic nature of the discipline and exposes 
some of evaluations internal frictions, particularly in relation to epistemological and 
methodological issues.  Emphasis is given to demonstrating the evolving character of 
evaluation; the 'theme of transition' that runs through evaluation's history also runs 
through the literature.  Accordingly, attribution is best understood by looking at how its 
meaning and significance within evaluation has changed over time.   
 
Following this, an exploration of the links between evaluation research and social 
scientific research is presented, revealing evaluation's epistemological and 
methodological dependence on the social sciences.  This helps to demonstrate how 
evaluation has at times learned from the shortcomings of the social sciences, and at time 
repeated them.  A number of dominant research methods and model for attempting to 
establish causation are reviewed, with emphasis on the experimental and quasi-
experimental approaches.  In particular, the notion of causation is carefully considered 
and its problematic nature within social research exposed.  It becomes clear that, ‘cause’ 
and ‘effect’ relationships with social research are, in fact, always correlational, 
‘probabilistic’ relationships.  Awareness of this fundamental misrepresentation places the 
attribution question on immediate unstable ground. 
 
  Next, a portrait of evaluation research as a dynamic field comprised of diverse 
practices is presented.  To understand the unique issues surrounding the attribution 
problem, evaluation is disaggregated in terms of sector, and level of intervention and 
analysis.  This reveals the conditions in which determining attribution becomes most 
complicated, and those conditions in which it is most feasible.  It shows how, as sectors 
become more 'complex' in nature, attribution becomes more difficult.  Similarly, as the 
level of intervention moves from the 'simple' project level to the 'comprehensive' program 
level, attributing results typically becomes less feasible.  Also, attribution is more likely 
to be established when analyzing at the output, or even outcome level, and, less likely at 
the impact level.  Because of its prevalence within evaluation research, and its 
significance with respect to the attribution question, the Logical Framework Analysis 
approach is explored in substantial detail. 
   
Finally, attribution is examined in relation to the 'paradigm shift' that evaluation 
experienced during the 1980s and into the 1990s.  Often referred to as the quantitative/ 
qualitative debate, this shift represents an epistemological schism within the discipline, 
and is followed by the emergence of alternative evaluation approaches and research 
methodologies.  Within the field of evaluation, emphasis turned away from measuring 
and 'proving', and toward understanding and 'improving'.  The emergence of 
‘participatory’ and ‘action’ oriented approaches, and of evaluation that stresses ‘good 
 4 
governance’ and ‘capacity building’ reflect a shift in the purpose and practice of 
evaluation research; and ultimately, in the nature and significance of the attribution 
question. 
 
Evaluator Thomas Cook reflects on what he has learned during his 25 years 
practicing evaluation research, and presents the following itemized summary: 'After years 
of debate, qualitative methods have become accepted'; 'knowledge claims are based on a 
synthesis of research, not just on one study'; 'contrary to what one might expect, results 
do not often inform policy decisions, but rather 'enlighten' the situation'; 'evaluation is 
fragmented by discipline and methodology – this can, and should be, remedied' (Cook, 
1997).  Consequently, there is no single or simple answer to the attribution question, and 
the literature on the topic represents a ‘work in progress'.  To be sure, the ongoing 'burden 
to demonstrate proof' has helped to secure an important place for attribution within aid 
evaluation.  However, recent innovations in thinking have altered both the meaning and 
significance of attribution.  No longer is determining attribution necessarily dependent on 
empirical measurement, and no longer is attribution necessarily the principal aim for 
evaluators interested in 'understanding' how people are changed by complex processes. 
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Because they are typically not self-supporting and beholden unto third parties for 
financial assistance, voluntary organizations face constant pressure to show that they are 
achieving what they said they would do.  They are required continually to justify their 
existence and to provide a rationale for their work.  They carry a heavy and ongoing 
burden: proof of legitimacy. 
 






The field of professional evaluation has undergone remarkable expansion and 
transformation since its inception in the United States over fifty years ago.  Today, 
international interventions ranging from economic and technical initiatives to social and 
cultural programs incorporate Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) into their design.1  
And, while the growth of evaluation has been accompanied by a diversification of its 
practices and applications, one of its 'primary objectives' has remained essentially the 
same: To assure that organizations are accountable to their stakeholders by assessing the 
degree of success (and/or failure) of a specific intervention whose implementation was 
sponsored by that organization. More precisely, evaluation is defined in terms of its 
systematic approach to assessing the particular effects of a given social intervention:  
 
Evaluation research is the systematic application of social research procedures in  
assessing the conceptualization, implementation and utility of social intervention  
programs (Rossi and Freeman, 1993:5).2 
 
From the onset, perhaps the single most important question for policy researchers 
and evaluators was not whether or what to assess, but rather how to assess the change 
resultant from specific interventions.  How can evaluation research determine if a given 
intervention 'caused' a particular outcome?  How can a specific 'effect' be attributed to a 
distinct 'cause'?  The issue of 'attribution' provides a particularly troublesome thorn in the 
side of evaluation research, and it has, at times, divided the field and threatened to 
undermine the discipline (Elzinga, 1981; Patton, 1997; Mark, 2001).  Historically, the 
conflict has proceeded at two interrelated levels: At the epistemological level in which 
issues of 'causation' are central; and at the methodological level where practicing 
evaluators dispute the strengths and limitations of different evaluation designs and 
                                                          
1 Within the literature, monitoring and evaluation often are used interchangeably; however they are 
distinctive by purpose and design.  Monitoring is usually seen as an ongoing process of data collection, 
carried out ‘in-house’, in order to track inputs and outputs, serving the interest and need of the management 
staff.  Evaluations, on the other hand, are typically periodic or single studies, conducted by teams external 
to the project, which attempt to measure intermediate results and longer-term impacts (Bennendijk, 
1990:166). 
2 Innumerable definitions of evaluation exist today. The Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) 
defines evaluation as: "[A] collection of methods, skills and sensitivities necessary to determine whether a 
human service is needed and likely to be used, whether it is conducted as planned, and whether the human 
service actually does help people" (Posavac and Carey, 1980:6).  
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approaches.  The epistemological and methodological positions, which have provided the 
basis and rationale for the disunity within evaluation research, are drawn primarily from 
the social and natural sciences (Rebien, 1996).  And, while many of these divisions have 
endured and are visible within the current 'state of the discipline', it is from this dialectic 
that important advances have been made.  That is, it might be said that evaluation’s 
internal struggle for epistemological verity and methodological rigor has brought about 
important advancements in its professional knowledge and practices. 
 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Working Group on Aid 
Evaluation has defined attribution as: 
  
The ascription of a causal link between observed (or expected to be observed)  
changes and a specific intervention.  Attribution refers to that which is to be  
credited for the observed changes or results achieved.  It represents the extent to  
which observed development effects can be attributed to a specific intervention  
or to performance of one or more partner taking account of other interventions,  
(anticipated or unanticipated) confounding factors, or external shocks (OECD,  
2002:17).   
 
Today most evaluators are familiar with the general concerns and considerations involved 
in attributing change, but arguably fewer possess a comprehensive understanding of the 
epistemological foundations on which causal claims are made within evaluation research.  
Satisfied with the soundness of their methods and designs, practicing evaluators may not 
question the standards of evidence for establishing attribution.  But within certain 
branches of evaluation research, methodological considerations have proven to be more 
acute – notably, those that deal with comprehensive interventions that are embedded in 
complex social systems.  Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the field of 
international development research wherein the socio-economic, environmental, political 
and cultural dynamics of 'aid' efforts provide highly unique challenges for evaluators; 
where change is seldom attributable to any single factor, and can be extremely 
unpredictable.  Moreover, faced with the external pressure to demonstrate results, 
development organizations and stakeholders are increasingly ‘burdened’ by having to 
prove the value of their initiatives to legitimize their work.  It is from this burden – from 
these challenges – that creative alternatives to the traditional modes of conducting 




ORGANIZATION OF THE TEXT 
 
Organized into three (3) sections, the following is a review of the prominent past 
and contemporary literature related to attributing results within evaluation research.  The 
first provides some historical background related to evaluation research generally and 
international development evaluation specifically, as well as definitions of relevant terms 
and concepts.  This section also establishes the context for the ensuing discussion and is 
meant to 'ground' the literature review.  Part two presents a sketch of the historical issues 
concerning the idea of causality – from the legacy of early social scientific 
epistemological discourse, to the more prevalent methodological dialogue generally 
referred to as the quantitative-qualitative debate.  Again, this section is meant to provide 
a sketch of the etiology of the current 'attribution question', and is therefore only an 
introductory treatment of the topic.  The third section directly examines the 'attribution 
problem' as it has played out in the substantive and theoretical evaluation literature.  
Perspectives are drawn from the different frontline and academic sources and matched 
with evaluation research specific to development assistance. 3  Specifically, the 
attribution question is explored in terms of different evaluation research sectors (i.e., 
'simple' non-human/non-social systems versus 'complex' human/social systems), and in 
terms of different levels of intervention and analysis (e.g., 'simple' project versus 
'comprehensive' program).  Moreover, an account of the evolution of evaluation models 
and approaches illustrates how evaluators have responded to the problems associated 
with attempting to determine attribution, exposing the changing shape of evaluation 
research. To achieve these aims, literature from three interconnected areas is reviewed:  
 
o Theoretical literature – predominantly academic writings;  
o Substantive literature – project results from international development evaluations; 




                                                          
3 Development assistance is “a social intervention measure, whether it be aid to a particular project, a sector 
in a given country or an entire program covering several sectors.  Aid interventions are deliberate and 
intentional attempt on the part of a public or private body - the aid agency to introduce development to a 
recipient organization, whether the latter be public, private, or a group of individuals” (Rebien, 1996:2).  
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EVALUATION RESEARCH – BACKGROUND & TERMS 
 
Program evaluation as a distinct field of professional practice was borne of two 
lessons… First, the realization that there is not enough money to do all the things that 
need doing; and second, even if there were enough money, it takes more than money to 
solve complex human and social problems.  As not everything can be done, there must be 
a basis for deciding which things are worth doing.  Enter evaluation. 
 
– Michael Patton, 1997 
 
 
While the seeds of evaluation date back to pre-World War I, its professional roots 
are entrenched in the mid twentieth-century American experiences of social and 
economic transformation and reform.4  Within the literature, the portrait of the advent 
and rise of professional evaluation describes a series of deleterious social and economic 
circumstances intersecting, and the political resolve to develop programs to address these 
conditions efficiently and effectively.  The social and economic experiences and 
reverberations of the 1930s Depression saw the commitment of the U.S. federal 
government to confront and reduce social problems such as poverty, hunger and 
unemployment.  But, early programs were typically without systematic assessment of 
their effectiveness and efficiency.  It was not until the establishment of the ‘welfare state’ 
under the Kennedy and Johnson administration that evaluation began to flourish 
(Bennendijk, 1990; Chelimsky and Shadish, 1997; Patton, 1997; Rebien, 1996); and it 
was the demand for economic accountability that provided the basis for systematic 
evaluation:  
 
It was not until the massive federal expenditures on an awesome assortment of  
programs during the 1960s and 1970s that accountability began to mean more  
than assessing staff sincerity or political head counts of opponents and proponents  
(Patton, 1997:10).   
 
Through the 1970s and 1980s evaluation developed steadily into a professional 
field, diversifying its practices and expanding its scope, and seeing a miscellany of 
project and program interventions being evaluated.  Correspondingly, the demand for 
practicing evaluators – and for the professionalization of training and skills – expanded, 
witnessing the rise of organizations such as the Evaluation Network and the Evaluation 
Research Society in the 1970s.  These two associations amalgamated in 1985 to become 
the American Evaluation Society (AES), which many considered “the leading 
international forum for exchange of evaluation theory and methodology between 
academics, consultants and civil servants…” (Rebien, 1996:12).  Throughout the 1980’s 
and 1990s, national and international professional evaluation associations were instituted 
                                                          
4 It should be noted that it is difficult to discern, from the literature alone, whether the strong emphasis on 
the American origins and history of evaluation is a product of historical veracity, or due to bias in the 
literature – i.e., a disproportion of U.S. literature on evaluation.   
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in countries as far reaching as the United Kingdom, Israel, Ghana and Malaysia.5  In 
Canada, the Canadian Evaluation Society (CES) exists as a “non-profit bilingual 
association dedicated to the advancement of evaluation theory and practice” (CES 
website, 2002), and is comprised of regional chapters representing over 1,600 members.   
In addition to regional, national, and international associations, almost all government 
branches, as well as non-government organizations (such as, the IDRC, United Nations, 
the World Bank, and the Red Cross) have all incorporated evaluation into their research 
practices.  The legitimization of the discipline is also evidenced in the number of 
universities that currently offer graduate programs in professional evaluation – 77 
masters and doctoral programs offered in American universities alone (Rebien, 1996).  
 
 The evolution of evaluation practice has been accompanied by a transformation in 
its meaning and an expansion of its purpose.  Today, hundreds of different kinds of 
evaluation can be found in the literature (see Patton, 1982), which tend to be grouped into 
one of two types: "[T]hose that aim to determine if the program has been implemented as 
planned, and those that measure its success in achieving its objectives (i.e., its impact)" 
(HRDC, 1998).  Respectively, these two types are often labeled 'formative' or process and 
'summative' or impact evaluation.  However this dichotomy does not reveal the complex 
nature of the term, therefore evaluation will be disaggregated based on purpose and type.  
According to Claus Rebien (1996), the three broad purposes of evaluation are 
accountability, implementation, and strategy/policy.  The importance of accountability 
in evaluation is habitually linked to the cost and expected effects of a given social 
intervention.  Accountability tends to be more critical in evaluations of social 
interventions that are publicly funded by scarce taxpayers’ dollars.  More often, 
accountability “refers to the requirement to show that funds for social interventions have 
been spent as intended and in ways that produce desirable results” (Rebien, 1996:13-14).  
At the same time, the concentration and growth of social interventions over the last 50 
years has meant increased focus on the evaluation of implementation; understanding and 
improving the implementation process has become a chief goal for evaluation.  In 
addition, by providing critical information to decision makers about the performance or 
'effects' of a given social intervention, evaluation serves the purpose of informing 
strategic planning and decision-making (Rebien, 1996:13-14).  As Patton explains, 
“the purpose of applied research and evaluation is to inform action, enhance decision 
making, and apply knowledge to solve human and societal problems” (Patton, 1990:12).  
 
Rebien also distinguishes between five (5) categories of evaluation each linked to 
the particular stage of social intervention.  They are: Process, effectiveness, monitoring, 
evaluation synthesis, and meta evaluation.  The first type, process, often referred to as 
‘formative evaluation', places less emphasis on determining outcomes or effects, and 
more on the process involved in generating such outcomes and effects.  The second, 
effectiveness, often called ‘summative evaluation’ or ‘impact evaluation’, is one of the 
                                                          
5For a list of several leading national evaluation associations, see the Canadian Evaluation Society’s 
webpage – http://www.evaluationcanada.ca/site.cgi?section=6&ssection=3&_lang=an 
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more recognized types of evaluation.6  Its aim is to "measure the effects of a given 
intervention and to answer the crucial question of whether the inputs have led to the 
desired outputs” (Rebien, 1996:14).  Third, monitoring typically serves the purpose of 
measuring change by looking at ‘performance indicators’.  It is ongoing and normally 
carried out by people directly involved with the intervention.  The fourth category is 
evaluation synthesis, which compiles and integrates the results of many related 
evaluations to draw general conclusions about change.  And the fifth, meta evaluation, 
refers to the evaluation of evaluation practices.  It is typically carried out by academics 
and involves the intricate examination of the methods and approaches employed in 
evaluation so as to determine and improve their methodological and theoretical 
soundness (Rebien, 1996:14-15).  It is important to note that this categorization is meant 
to illustrate the variety of evaluation types, and that oftentimes a single evaluation may 
involve more than one emphasis.  Therefore, building on other definitions, evaluation is:  
 
[A]pplied research intentionally designed to assess social interventions, which can  
serve three distinct purposes: accountability, implementation, and strategy/policy.   
There  are five evaluation subcategories: process-, impact-, monitoring, evaluation  
synthesis and meta evaluation.  Each category is linked to a different phase of an  
intervention (Rebien, 1996:15).  
 
It is worth mentioning that other conceptualizations of evaluation will be explored in 
detail in the ensuing sections.  Nonetheless, the above definition serves as a useful 





Emerging out of the need to systematically account for the dramatic increase in 
public spending on social programs during the early welfare years in the United States, 
evaluation has undergone an extremely rapid transition toward become a widespread 
professional discipline.  The following historical sketch, as well as the broad definition, 
disaggregated by evaluation type and purpose, provides an overview of the dynamic 
character of the discipline.  Additionally, it sets a theme that permeates this review – 
specifically, evaluation as theory and practice continues to evolve in meaning and 
purpose. 
                                                          
6 Chris Roche offers the following 'common' definition of impact assessment: "Impact assessment is the 
systematic analysis of the lasting or significant changes - positive or negative, intended or not - in people's 





 Understanding aid evaluation in its present state requires an explanation of its 
distinct nature, as well as an outline of its historical lineage.  Although no single 
definition will capture all the complexities of aid evaluation, the following developed by 
the Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) Expert Group on Evaluation (a unit 
within the OECD) provides a comprehensive characterization.  Aid evaluation is defined 
as: 
 
[A]n examination as systematic and objective as possible of an on-going or  
completed project or programme, its design, implementation and results.  The  
aim is to determine the relevance and fulfillment of objectives, developmental  
efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.  An evaluation should  
provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of  
lessons learned into the decision-making process of both recipients and donors  
(OECD, 1992:132).   
 
Aid evaluation typically differs from other types of evaluation in terms of the nature of 
the 'project or program, its design, implementation and results’.  Consequently, the 
methodologies employed in aid evaluation, as well as the standards of evidence for 
assessing results, are often distinct.      
 
For organizations involved in development assistance and relying on limited 
public funds to sponsor and implement research in foreign countries, the incorporation of 
evaluation has been essential.  Aid evaluation can be traced back to the 1950s, however it 
was not until the 1970s and 80s that systematic evaluation became an integrated 
component in almost all bilateral and multilateral government and non-government aid 
agencies (Rebien, 1996).  One time chairman of the OECD’s Expert Group on 
Evaluation, Basil Cracknell (2000) offers a brief, four-phase history of the development 
of aid evaluation:8  
 
 The first phase – early developments (from the late 1960s to 1979) – is 
characterized by the early implementation of evaluation by US and UN aid organizations.  
During this phase, two events were of particular significance in the development of aid 
evaluation: The adoption of evaluation by USAID, and the development of an evaluation 
guidance manual for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) by the leading evaluators of the day – Rossi and Freeman.  Both helped to 
                                                          
7 The term 'aid evaluation' will be used throughout this text to refer to all international development 
initiatives, projects, and programs undergoing evaluation. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) Expert Group on Aid Evaluation identifies two specific aims of aid evaluation: 
“To improve future aid policy, programmes and projects through feedback of lessons learned;” and, “[to] 
provide a basis for accountability, including the provision of information to the public” (Rebien, 1996:47).  
Additionally, Michael Bamberger offers the following definition of development programs: "[A]ll social 
and economic programs in developing countries funded by multilateral and bilateral development agencies 
or by international non-government organizations (NGOs)" (2000:96).  
8 Cracknell’s original history of aid evaluation consisted of three phases; the fourth phase is the result of 
input from Claus Rebien (1996).  
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legitimize aid evaluation and provide direction to its professional course.  Early aid 
evaluation was generally carried out by academics working out of universities; it 
commonly adopted the practices and techniques of 'conventional' evaluation whose ‘tool 
of choice’ was the Logical Framework Approach (LFA) (Cracknell, 2000).9  From the 
onset evaluators were concerned about how to evaluate development assistance given that 
most donor agencies were only one part of a confluence of aid initiatives.  And, questions 
about whether to study at the project or program level troubled (and continue to trouble) 
aid evaluators.  Additionally, Cracknell explains that during phase one, “evaluation took 
very much a second place to economic project appraisal, which was seen as crucial to 
good project selection and formulation” (Cracknell, 2000:43). 
 
The demand for evaluations that accompanied the widespread funding cuts during 
the late 1970s marks the beginning of the second phase – explosion of interest (from 
1979 to 1984).  This phase is characterized by a surge of interest in the theory and 
methods of evaluation, as well as a number of significant transformations in evaluation 
practices.  Lead by the World Bank, aid evaluation began to explore such avenues as, 
synthesizing evaluations within a given sector, multidonor evaluations, and longitudinal 
evaluations.  Additionally, the World Bank established internal operating guidelines 
(IBRD Operations Evaluation – World Bank Standards and Procedure, 1979) that 
became the model for other development agencies; at the same time, monitoring and 
evaluation agencies were being set up in developing countries (Cracknell, 2000). 
 
Phase three – coming of age (from 1984 to 1988) – is characterized by a critical 
questioning of traditional methods for conducting evaluation.  It was during this period 
that evaluators and stakeholders were beginning to see ‘top-down’ approaches of 
administering aid as problematic.  That is, ‘top-down’ approaches tended to designate a 
disproportionate authority and control over the evaluation process to the evaluators and 
their representative organizations, neglecting stakeholders’ input and participation.10  
Consequently, ‘bottom-up’ approaches (such as participatory evaluations) began to 
emerge during this phase (Patton, 2001).  During this period, two landmark studies 
(Cassen et al., 1986; and, Riddell, 1987) were instrumental in promoting the field of aid 
evaluation, and “still stand today as the most comprehensive studies of long-term aid 
effects” (Rebien, 19996:49).   
 
The fourth phase – aid evaluation at the crossroads (1988 to the present) – is 
marked by a shift away from evaluation that emphasized project management and logical 
frameworks, to evaluation that focused on participatory approaches, accentuating 
partnership, learning and capacity building.  Moreover, drawing on the contributions of 




                                                          
9 A full discussion of Logical Frameworks will follow. 
10 Pasteur, for instance, draws attention to the dis-empowering character of the Logical Framework 
Approach: “[I]t is an imposed procedure, thus maintaining a relationship of control and domination, that 
does not reflect the… principles of participation and partnership” (Pasteur, 2001:2)   
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The whole aid business is changing in significant ways: there are fewer discrete  
projects now and more emphasis on sectors and programmes and on types of aid  
that are intrinsically difficult to evaluate such as good governance, community  
empowerment, poverty alleviation, human rights, etc. (Cracknell, 2000:48). 
 
Notably, this ‘fourth phase’ may also be understood as a reflection of the professional 
changes taking place throughout this period within the field of aid evaluation.  It 
represents a departure from the kinds of evaluation practices that stress ‘attribution’ – 
whose goals are to determine ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ – and which focus on single projects 
and sectors.  To appreciate the implications of these changes, one need only look to the 
World Bank’s report entitled Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why? This 
comprehensive study by senior research economist David Dollar is grounded in the 
experiences of ‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’ developing countries, and provides a 
penetrating analysis of the effectiveness of international development assistance.  
Emphasizing institutional ‘health’ within recipient countries as a precondition for aid to 
be able to successfully stimulate development, the report lists broad policy reforms that 
are essential to making aid more effective in reducing poverty.  By illuminating the 
complex relationship between aid and development, the report also exposes the 
multifarious nature of aid evaluation.   
 
The effectiveness of finance depends on the quality of all public investments and 
expenditures, not simply on aid-financed sectors and projects. This finding has  
important implications for the evaluation and management of aid. Agencies often  
hone in on the success rate of individual projects as one measure of their effectiveness.  
At first glance, this appears to be a focus on “quality.” But it can lead to distorted  
incentives, depending on the criteria for judging success. Since money is often  
fungible, the return to any particular project financed by aid does not reveal the true  
effect of assistance. Moreover, if agencies are evaluated mainly on the success rate of 
projects (defined narrowly, without accounting for spillover benefits), managers will  
avoid risky, innovative projects in favor of things that are known to work. With  
fungibility, the impact of aid is not the same as the impact of the aid-financed project.  
The return on the finance depends on the overall effectiveness of public expenditures  
(World Bank, 1998:20).  
 
Thus, the ‘new’ aid evaluation emphasizes principles such as ‘partnership’, 
‘empowerment’ and ‘action’, but also understands the need to encompass the broad and 
complex socio-cultural, economic, and political factors that contribute to the success or 
failure of aid initiatives.  As a result, effectively assessing international aid has meant 
that, “[t]he focus of evaluation has risen above the level of the project to overall country 
program reviews (World Bank, 1998:20).  Consequently, aid evaluation requires new, 
compatible methodological techniques and procedures – ones able to appropriately 
address the emerging objectives of modern aid evaluation.  
 
Today, several key objectives guide the evaluation of aid work.  In addition to 
producing data and knowledge that can be used to improve the implementation process, 
the design of future activities, as well as inform policy and strategic planning, aid 
evaluation “provides information on the effectiveness and efficiency of aid activities, and 
thus accountability towards politicians and the public” (Rebien, 1996:4).  The importance 
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of accountability – of monitoring funds – was not only significant in the early days of aid 
work, it has become a driving force behind the implementation and maintenance of aid 
evaluations today (Rebien, 1996).  Still, according to Rebien over its fifty year history, 
“relatively little attention has been given to the theoretical and methodological aspects of 
aid evaluation” (1996:5).  As a result, there lacks consensus on the best means of 
obtaining ‘information on the effectiveness and efficiency of aid activities’.  And, as will 
be explicated in the following sections, efforts to establish acceptable methods for 
acquiring information, as well as standards for assessing its validity, have been plagued 
with controversy.   
 
Moreover, the uniqueness of aid evaluation presents challenges that may not be 
comparable to other areas of evaluation research.  On the one hand, aid evaluators often 
find themselves working within highly demanding physical environments: scarcity of 
funding and limited resources, sometimes unfamiliar settings, and potentially ‘high-risk’ 
situations contribute to the challenge.  At the same time, the distinctiveness of the socio-
cultural contexts of international aid evaluation often translates into obstacles for 
evaluators.  For instance, access to and quality of information, cross-cultural ideological 
differences, as well as general communications are but a few of the conditions that 
complicate aid evaluation.  As Michael Bamberger explains: “[e]valuators of 
international development programs normally must operate in a very different 
environment than one would expect to find when evaluating U.S. programs" (Bamberger, 
2000:95).  And, although development projects have the benefit of relying on 30 years of 
evaluation wisdom when selecting and implementing methodologies, "the evaluation 
issues in many of these new international venues are not always the same as those 






Understanding aid evaluation requires awareness of its distinct character and 
history.  Aid evaluation can be dated back to the 1950s where it was chiefly practiced by 
academics. Extensive public funding cuts during the 1970s and into the 1980s saw an 
expansion of evaluation of internationals aid, and marked the professionalization of aid 
evaluation.  The growth of aid evaluation during the 1980s was accompanied by a critical 
re-assessment of the theories and methods that dominated evaluation generally; 
specifically, ‘top-down’ approaches were recognized by many to be inappropriate for 
evaluating programs in culturally unique settings.  In recent years, aid evaluation has 
witnessed a shift away from ‘top-down’ approaches, and has emphasized such ideals as 
‘partnership’, ‘empowerment’, ‘capacity-building’, and ‘good governance’.  It has also 
begun to deal with the unique challenges of evaluating complex, comprehensive systems.  
What is therefore important to keep in mind, and will be illustrated in the ensuing, is how 
aid evaluation often differs from other types of evaluation in terms of the nature of the 
'project or program, its design, implementation and results’.  As a result, it often employs 
distinct methodologies and standards of evidence.  
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CAUSATION – BACKGROUND & TERMS 
 
All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causation is one of the fundamental 
axioms or postulates of science, yet, oddly enough, in advanced sciences such as 
gravitational astronomy, the word ‘cause' never occurs ... The law of causality, I believe, 
like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, 
like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm. 
 
 – Bertrand Russell, 1913 
 
 
With the historical background and relevant concepts employed as a backdrop, it 
is now possible to discuss the specific issue of attributing causes and effects within 
evaluation research.  In doing so, a brief explication of evaluation's social scientific 
heritage and a general outline of the principles and preliminaries of causation and causal 
inferences will be provided.  This framework will inform remaining sections of the paper 
and expose the abstruse, and oftentimes controversial, nature of the concepts 'causation' 
and 'attribution' as they relate to social research generally and evaluation specifically.   
 
 
CAUSATION & THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
From its inception, social science has been particularly concerned with 
developing causal explanations of social phenomena.  Although the scope of this paper 
does not warrant an elaboration of the philosophical bases of early social scientific 
conceptualizations of causation, a provisional account of the social science's 
epistemological and methodological foundation is necessary.  Historically, one of the 
most complex and important issues within the social sciences has centered on modes of 
establishing causal relations among different variables.  Informed by the natural sciences, 
early social scientific accounts of causal relations adopted a positivist approach.  
Essentially they maintained that, cause and effect could only be 'determined' 
scientifically; that it must be informed by theory and based on empirical observation, 
systematic experimentation, and quantitative (i.e., statistical) analyses (Rebien, 1996; den 
Heyer, 2001; Patton, 2001).  Accordingly, positivist methods and procedures were 
appropriated by social science and employed to explain phenomena within the social 
world.  Early sociologists were, thus, primarily interested in quantifiable measurement 
and analysis that, through experimentation, could expose patterns and regularities, 
leading to general social laws. The quintessential example of early positivist sociology is 
Emile Durkheim's classic study, Suicide, in which he supports his theory that suicide is 
causally linked to 'social cohesion' by employing rigorous empirical/positivist data 
gathering methods and statistical analyses. 
 
Unlike the natural sciences in which the subject matter can be isolated and 
manipulated under controlled conditions, causation within the social sciences has proven 
to be far more problematic.  The principle of 'cause' and 'effect' typically implies a 
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process involving a relationship between one or more independent variables (the cause) 
and a dependent variable (the effect), and tends to be represented as:  
 
if X then Y (or, X  Y) 
if cause then effect (or, cause  effect) 
 
Rooted in the work of philosopher John Stuart Mill, three conditions are generally 
considered to be 'necessary but not sufficient' for inferring causation.  The first condition 
is that of covariation which stipulates that cause and effect have to be related – that the 
effect (Y) will be present when the cause (X) is present, and the effect will be absent 
when the cause is absent.  The second involves the principle of temporality and specifies 
that the cause (X) must precede the effect (Y) in time.  And, the third condition requires 
that the relationship between X and Y be non-spurious, meaning that there is no other 
variable determining both X and Y concurrently (Mason, 1991; Lofland and Lofland, 
1995).11  So for example, if one were to hypothesize a causal relationship between 
strenuous physical exercise and level of perspiration, one would first want to ensure that 
these three conditions were met.  Specifically, if perspiration is present then physical 
exercise must also be present; the exercise must have preceded the perspiration; and, 
perspiration resulted from exercise and not some other factor (for example, 
environmental temperature or nervousness).  
 
Today, however, as the notion of causation has become increasingly elaborate and 
complex, early 'scientific' methods for determining causation are recognizably overly 
simplistic.12  Moreover, the belief in causal explanation in evaluation research may be 
excessively optimistic.  In the social world, there are too many influencing variables to be 
able to "formulate an evaluation project in terms of a series of hypotheses which state that 
'activities A, B, C will produce results X, Y, Z'" (House, 2001:311).  Moreover, 
 
We have huge gaps in our knowledge of social events, gaps we don't know about,  
and gaps we don't even know we don't know about.  We can never fill these gaps  
in so we can never be certain of all that is involved (House, 2001: 312).   
 
Nonetheless, efforts to draw causal links and determine exact project outcomes continue 




Establishing causation – explaining the ‘causes’ and ‘effects’ of social phenomena – 
has been central to the social sciences through its history.  Modeled after the natural 
sciences, social scientific research adopted the philosophical assumptions and analytical 
techniques of logical positivism.  Insofar as its aim is to determine empirically grounded 
social patterns and regularities, generalizations and laws, experimentation and quasi-
experimentation have been the historical method of choice for positivist social science.        
 
                                                          
11 Note that alternative conceptualizations of 'causation' will be explored in subsequent sections (e.g., 
'mutual causality', 'interdependence', et cetera). 
12 See Ragin (1997) for a detailed account of the issues associated with causation in the social sciences. 
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EXPERIMENTATION & QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION 
  
Having established a causal hypothesis, the next step would be to engineer an 
experiment to test its soundness.  Following the principles of the 'scientific method', 
experimentation entails the deliberate and systematic manipulation of a given process, 
and the observation and measurement of change in that process.13 However, depending 
on the nature and conditions of the investigation, any one of a number of experimental 
designs could be employed.  The following is a description of some of the more familiar 
experimental and quasi-experimental designs (see Figure 1).14  Ordinarily there are two 
broad types of experimental models, comparison group and single group, each having 
several design possibilities: posttest only, pretest-posttest, or time series.  
 
Comparison Group: Posttest Only Design    
 
One of the more common experimental approaches involves the comparison of 
two groups – an experimental group and a control group.  Ideally, the two are identical in 
every way except that in one – the experimental group – the independent variable of 
interest is manipulated (i.e., the group is subject to an intervention, often referred to as 
'treatment'), and in the other – the control group – the independent variable is not 
manipulated.  In posttest only designs, an outcome variable of interest is measured in 
both groups, but only after the intervention.  A difference between the groups is often 
used to imply the effect of the intervention.  However, since there is not baseline data in 
posttest only design (information taken prior to the intervention about the outcome 
variable), there is no way of knowing if the effect was the result of the intervention or of 
some other external factor(s).    
 
Comparison Group: Pretest-Posttest Design 
 
Perhaps the most widely accepted, and arguably the best model for investigating 
causal relationships, is the pretest-posttest comparison group experimental design.  It is 
similar to the posttest only design except that it measures the outcome variable of interest 
in both groups before and after the intervention.  Therefore the change in the 
experimental group after the manipulation of the independent variable is compared to the 
change in the control group to determine if the intervention had an effect (Gould and 
William, 1964; Rossi and Freeman, 1993).  Moreover, "with chance differences largely 
                                                          
13 "The scientific method is based on hypothetico-deductive methodology.  Simply put, this means that 
researchers/evaluators test hypotheses about the impact of a social initiative using statistical analysis 
techniques" (W.K Kellogg Foundation, 1998:5) 
14 Quasi-experimental designs are distinguished from 'true' experimental designs in that the latter employs a 
process of randomly assigning participants into control and treatment groups, while the former does not. 
Randomly assigning individuals makes pre-testing unnecessary, and helps to ensure that groups are as 
similar as possible.  Also, 'true' experiment is often seen as more 'scientific' than quasi experimentation.  
For a defense of 'true' experimentation see Friedlander and Robins (1995), Burtless (1995), and see 
Heckman, Hotz, & Dabos, (1987), Heckman and Smith, (1995) for a defense of quasi-experimentation.  
"Most sociological research is not - and, for both practical and ethical reasons, cannot be - ['true'] 





accounted for through standard statistical techniques" (Greenberg and Wiseman, 1992), it 
is suggested that this is the superior model for inferring causal relationships.  Using the 
above example, a pretest-posttest comparison experiment of the causal relationship 
between strenuous physical exercise and perspiration level would first entail assigning 
individuals into one of two groups – control or experimental.  The perspiration levels of 
two groups would then be measured, following which a strenuous exercise regiment 
would be introduced to the experimental group only.  The perspiration levels of the two 
groups would once again be measured and compared.  Assuming non-spuriousness and 
controlling for other extraneous variables (i.e., ensuring that no outside factors interfere 
with the experiment), any difference in the level of perspiration between the two groups 
would be attributed to the introduction of the independent variable – i.e., strenuous 
physical exercise causes perspiration.  
 
Comparison Group: Time Series 
 
The fundamental difference between the pretest-posttest comparison and the time 
series comparison is that the latter incorporates multiple measurements of the outcome 
variable after the intervention.  This procedure is performed to reduce uncertainty about 
the effect of the intervention – i.e., it diminishes the potentiality that the measured 
difference between groups was due to some extraneous/intervening variable.   
 
Single Group: Posttest Only Design 
 
While comparison group experimentation is often considered the 'ideal', it is 
frequently not practically or ethically feasible (Denzin, 1978; Ragin, 1994; den Heyer, 
2001:22).  In an extreme example, testing the effects of a new emergency medical 
procedure, it would be both impractical and unethical to randomly select critically ill 
patients and deny treatment to some in order to establish a control group.  In such cases, 
single-group designs are the more appropriate experimental method. 
 
The most basic of the many single-group experimental designs is the posttest only 
design.  This involves measuring the effect of a given intervention only after it has been 
introduced to the subjects.  Since there is usually no baseline data and no group with 
which to compare results, this design is often seen as the weakest – i.e., the least valid.  
Moreover, as suggested by the Evaluation and Data Development Strategic Policy 
Division of HRDC:  
 
This design cannot be used to credibly attribute any effects to the program, for  
there is no objective basis to suppose that the program caused any changes. Indeed,  
because there is no information on the pre-program level of the variable(s) of  
interest, this design yields no information on change (HRDC, 1998).  
 
Single Group: Pretest-Posttest Design 
 
The more common single group design is the pretest-posttest design.  This is 
generally used when the investigator is interested in knowing something about the change 
effected by a given intervention, but when ethical and practical consideration restrict the 
use of control groups.  Baseline data is systematically obtained by measuring the 
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variables of interest prior to the introduction of a given intervention.  Post-test 
information is then obtained by measuring those variables after the intervention.  So for 
example, the perspiration level of one group would be measured before and after the 
introduction of strenuous physical exercise.  A difference would suggest that physical 
exercise 'effected' the change in the perspiration levels.  
 
Single Group: Time Series 
 
 Additionally, time series designs can be used to modify single group pretest-
posttest experimentation, allowing change to be captured over time.  Time series designs 
require measuring change at different time intervals in order to capture the progression of 
change, and to increase the confidence in the validity of the findings. Nonetheless, 
without a comparison group, little definitively can be said about effect of the intervention 
per se (HRDC, 1998).  
 
Figure 1. Single and Comparison Group Experimental Design 
 
 Single-group  Comparison group 
 
Posttest only  
 
Measures the outcome variable only after 
the intervention 
 
No baseline data 
 
Cannot determine change   
 
Measures the outcome variable of two 
groups – control and treatment - only 
after the intervention 
 
No baseline data 
 
Comparison of the measured difference 
in outcome variable between control and 
treatment groups  
 
Pretest-posttest  Measures the outcome variable before 
and after the intervention 
 
Baseline data available 
 
No comparison group means that change 
cannot be attributed to the intervention 
Measures and compares the outcome 
variable of two groups – control and 
treatment – before and after the 
intervention 
 
Baseline data is available 
 
A difference in the control and treatment 
groups implies effect of the intervention  
 
Time series  Measures the outcome variable before 
the intervention and several times after 
 
Time series strengthens the validity of 
the findings 
 
Baseline data available 
 
No comparison group mean that change 
cannot be attributed to the intervention 
Measures and compares the outcome 
variable of two groups – control and 
treatment – before the intervention and 
several times after 
 
Time series strengthens the validity of 
the findings 
 
Baseline data is available 
 
A difference in the control and treatment 






Social science has traditionally ‘borrowed’ its research models from the natural 
sciences – adapting and modifying experimental designs for establish causation.  As 
outline above, the more prevalent models range from single to comparison group, and 
from pretest, to posttest and time series.  A review of these key experimental and quasi-
experimental designs reveals important strengths and limitations of each type.  Among 
the most serious concerns for experimentation is internal validity.  
 
 
INTERNAL VALIDITY & EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH  
 
Whether comparison or single group, posttest only, pretest-posttest, or time series, 
the most serious concern for experimentation has to do with internal validity.  
 
A study has internal validity to the extent that the data support conclusions about  
the hypothesis in the specified instance studied… We make judgments about  
internal validity by examining the procedural details of the specific study to decide  
whether the procedures used to measure and manipulate variables faithfully  
represented those variables (Stern, 1979:62). 
 
Campbell and Stanley (1963) submit seven (7) 'threats' to the internal validity of a study.  
Two of the threats involve actual changes in the environment or in participants.  
Historical changes in the environment which take place concurrently with the study (e.g., 
world or local events), and biological or physiological maturation of the participants in 
the study can effect the behaviour of the participants.  Three other threats may result 
when participants are not representative of the population.  The process of selecting and 
assigning individuals to 'treatment' or 'control' groups – especially in studies in which the 
treatment group is comprised of volunteer participants and the control group was asked to 
participate – can affect internal validity.  And, when participants drop out of the study, 
mortality, the internal validity can be weakened.15  Additionally, studies that employ 
statistical regression may encounter internal validity risks. That is, participants who 
score extremely high or low on a test may score much lower or higher on the next.  This 
is typically due to the inherent problem of random error within statistical regression.  
Finally, there are threats that might be provoked by the evaluators.  In pretest-posttest 
designs, testing can effect the internal validity of the study; participants may score 
differently on the posttest simply because they have already taken the test before.  And, 
instrumentation refers to the changes in the researchers, scores, and/or tools of 
measurement from one stage of the research to the next (Campbell and Stanley, 1963).  
 
Insofar as they are typically more at risk of the threats to internal validity, many 
feel that single group designs are inappropriate for measuring change, much less 
determining 'cause' and 'effect' relationships (HRDC, 1998).  Furthermore, it has been 
argued that through careful design and execution (as well as a skillful application of 
                                                          
15 Evaluation research tends to be particularly prone to problems associated with selection bias (such as, 
'cherry picking' and 'creaming').  
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statistical procedures), comparison group experimentation can limit the possibility of 
unanticipated, extraneous influences affecting the outcome of the experiment – 
minimizing internal validity – and, is therefore better suited for making causal inferences.  
Nevertheless, the problems associated with internal validity are especially pertinent to the 
field of aid evaluation where unpredictable and dynamic conditions heightens a program's 




One of the most significant risks involved in employing experimentation to provide 
‘causal’ interpretations is that of internal validity.  As outlined above, these risks include: 
historical change, maturation, sample selection, mortality, statistical regression, testing, 
and instrumentation.  And, it is important to keep in mind that while all social research 
employing experimentation may be susceptible to these dangers, single group designs are 
considered to be the most at risk of internal validity issues. 
  
 
EXPERIMENTATION & THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
In addition to the internal validity threats within experimentation generally, there 
exist several obstacles unique to social research when attempting to establish causal 
explanations: "To identify the causes and reasons for program failure or success, 
sophisticated research designs such as experimental designs, time series analysis, or panel 
studies are necessary.  However, these designs are not feasible in many circumstances" 
(Kuchler, 1981:168).  First, the complex nature of the social phenomena makes it highly 
difficult to isolate and control social variables; often, it is not possible to account for the 
unintended effects of a confluence of influences.  Moreover, phenomena within the social 
world are dynamic, therefore testing and measurement will always be embedded in a 
particular temporal context beyond which the findings can not be generalized.  Secondly, 
experimentation on human subjects may be inappropriate, if possible at all.  As 
previously indicated, testing and experimentation on human subjects is often unethical 
and/or impractical.  And insofar as inferring causation relies on experimentation, the 
'causes' of many social phenomena will go untested.  Finally, experimentation assumes 
that human social action (behaviour) can be studied in the same way that natural objects 
are studied – i.e., properties are isolated, manipulated, and observed.  It neglects the 
dynamic character of social action and how the meaning given by social actors to 
different situations alter those situations (Keat and Urry, 1975; Ragin, 1994; Roche, 
1999).  Molly den Heyer's review of different evaluation models within the sphere of 
international development reiterates the problems associated with experimental modeling 
of social programs:  
 
Proving causal inferences means that evaluation needs to utilize an experimental  
design that compares control groups that have not received the programs with  
groups that have.  This type of methodology is limited in social programs by the  
complex variables that make replication difficult if not impossible.  Further, there  
are ethical issues in providing social services to one group and not the other  
(den Heyer, 2001:22).    
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In addition, evaluations that employ control groups face unique problems.  Particularly, 
"…control groups may have even less incentive to co-operate (as they are by definition 
liable to remain excluded) or a greater incentive to exaggerate their needs (in the hope 
that someone responds)" (Roche, 1999:79).  Also, the basis for excluding one group may 
pose problems.  For instance, people may be excluded on the basis of their gender, 
ethnicity, or age.  Insofar as some groups are 'deliberately' left out of the project, Roche 
suggests that "as far as attribution is concerned, the existence of marginalized groups may 
not tell one much about what might have happened if the project in question had not 
occurred" (Roche, 1999:84).  
 
To be sure, the idea of causation poses a variety of philosophical and practical 
difficulties.  This is especially the case for the social research where the feasibility of 
making causal claims encounters great skepticism: 
 
There is always the question of whether, despite covariation and proper time order,  
you can ever be really certain a particular independent variable is the cause (or is  
among the important causes) of the dependent variable.  This is the classic problem  
of 'correlation not proving causation.'  Some other unknown factors, or some known  
but unmeasured factor, may be the cause or among the causes (Lofland and Lofland,  
1995:137). 
  
Still, as practicing researchers develop innovative methodologies and statistical 
procedures to strengthen the internal validity of their experimental designs, contemporary 
social science continues to speak in terms of 'causes' and 'effects'.  However, insofar as 
social scientific 'causation' has less to do with 'cause' and 'effect' per se than with 
correlation between variables (i.e., statistically probable association), what is 'erroneously 





Several conditions unique to social research make the use of experimentation and 
quasi-experimentation problematic.  In particular, the complexity and dynamic character 
of the social world means that isolating and controlling variables can be pragmatically 
difficult, and can raise serious ethical issues.  Different techniques are employed to 
address these concerns, yet the challenges are pronounced when researchers use 
experimentation to treat humans as ‘objects of study’. 
  
 
CORRELATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE & THE SHIFT TO 'PROBABILISTIC' CAUSATION  
 
 As sociologist John Goldthorpe (2001) explains, professional discourse has 
shifted away from notions of 'deterministic' causation to 'probabilistic' causation – i.e., 
"rather than causes being seen as necessitating their effects, they might be regarded as 
simply raising the probability of their occurrence" (Goldthorpe, 2001:1).  The complex 
nature of the social world, as well as the incompleteness of our knowledge about it, limits 
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the possibility of anything more than probabilistic explanations (Goldthorpe, 2001:1).  
Therefore, causation within the social sciences is seldom more than correlation between 
variables.  Michael Scriven elaborates: 
  
[Correlation is] neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for causation; nor  
necessary because causation can be established by eliminative induction (ruling  
out all other possible causes), and not sufficient because the correlated variables  
may both be effects of a third variable and have no direct influence on each  
other (e.g., yellowing of eye whites is not a cause of yellowing skin; if they  
correlate, it's because you have jaundice, probably caused by liver disease)  
(Scriven, 1991:104). 
 
Holding that causation within the social sciences is nothing more than statistically 
significant correlation, Goldthorpe describes several types of 'probabilistic' causation.  
Two of these represent the majority of empirical sociological research – robust 
dependence and consequential manipulation.  Quantitative social research has 
traditionally relied on robust dependence to make causal claims.  That is, controlling for 
all other extraneous variables and ruling out spuriousness, statistical techniques can 
demonstrate a robust dependence of Y (the effect) on X (the cause).  Because robust 
dependence tends to subordinate theory in favor of sophisticated statistical modeling, 
there has been growing disfavor of 'causation as robust dependence' among sociologists 
interested in empirical research and methodology.  
 
Especially from the standpoint of methodological individualism, sociologists have  
strongly criticized the supposition that statistical techniques can in themselves  
provide adequate causal explanations of social phenomena.  Such techniques show  
only the relations between variables, and not how these relations are actually produced  
- as they can indeed only be produced - through the action and interaction of  
individuals (Goldthorpe, 2001:3).   
 
Emerging out of robust dependence is the idea of causation as consequential 
manipulation, which essentially adheres to the principals of experimentation.  This 
approach to probabilistic causation currently dominates empirical, quantitative sociology.  
Controlling for other variables, a manipulation in X will effect a particular change in the 
units of Y.  And, this change is relative compared to the control group.  Furthermore, 
consequential manipulation recognizes that a dependent variable cannot be exposed and 
not exposed to the treatment in the same experiment; hence, elaborate statistical 
techniques have been devised to determine 'average causal effects' of control versus 
experimental groups – i.e., randomized experimental design.  Causation as consequential 
manipulation, if applied to evaluation research, exposed the limits of the attribution 
question.  "A variable X can never be regarded as having causal significance for Y in 
anything more than a provisional sense; for it is impossible to be sure that all other 
relevant variables have in fact been controlled" (Goldthorpe, 2001:5).16  In recent years 
                                                          
16 Goldthorpe presents an alternative approach to causation for the social sciences based on these three 
understandings of causation.  The alternative involves a sequence of three stages: a. establishing the 
phenomena that forms the explananda - this involves ensuring that the phenomenon is not unique, but 
occurs with some regularity. This requires statistical work, and is basically a descriptive exercise; b. 
hypothesizing the generative process at the level of social action - the next step is in determining the causes 
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there has been serious criticism of causation as robust dependence and consequential 
manipulation, and alternative positions suggested.  Goldthorpe summarizes Lieberson's 
(1985) proposed alternative direction for sociology:  
 
This entails a straight rejection of the attempt to impose the experimental model  
(or, at any rate, that adopted in medical or agricultural research) onto sociology,  
on the grounds that it represents and undue 'scientism' – i.e., an undue regard for  
the form rather than the substance of scientific method – and with the implication,  
then, that sociologists have to find their own ways of thinking about causation,  
proper to the kinds of research that they can realistically carry out and the problems  
that they can realistically address (Goldthorpe, 2001:8). 
 
Nevertheless, much evaluation work continues to employs probabilistic causal modeling 
to determine the effects of a given intervention.17  As will be shown, however, 
probabilistic causal modeling tends to be more likely in certain areas of evaluation 
research and less likely in others (such as, aid evaluation).  Additionally, one of the key 
determinants of the use of probabilistic causal modeling is choice of methodology.  As 
will be shown, the type of methodology employed in evaluation research plays a critical 
role in whether causal probability is sought, and vice versa.  
 
 
THE QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE DEBATE 
 
 Early social science tended to model itself after the natural sciences; however, the 
social sciences are also known for epistemological and methodological diversity.  Since 
the mid-nineteenth century, there has been a division within sociology about the principal 
aim of the discipline.18  While early on the status quo tended to assert the positivist 
position underscoring the importance of quantification, experimentation and the 
establishment of generalized social laws, others proposed more heuristic approaches, 
suggesting that sociology should be about facilitating an understanding of meaningful 
social action.  Methodologically, these two positions advocated fundamentally different 
strategies for studying the social world.  One endorsed empirically based data gathering 
and analyzing techniques, while the other adopted more interpretive methodologies (for 
an early example of this approach, see Max Weber's verstehen).19   This latter approach 
resisted the positivist perspective by stating that adequate explanation is best obtained 
through an 'empathetic understanding' of the meaning that people give their behaviour.  
The positivists responded that an approach based on the subjective interpretation of social 
action lacked objectivity and was therefore non-scientific.  Interestingly, early positivist 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of these social regularities.  Any number of theories of action can be used to hypothesize the cause of 
specific social regularities; and c. testing the hypothesis - hypothesis must first be adequate, but there may 
be competing adequate hypotheses, and therefore empirical validity should be established for each 
(Goldthorpe, 2001:10-14). 
17 See, for example, the Bayesian method.  As opposed to attempting to determine causation per se, this 
approach essentially seeks to increase the probability of X effecting Y.  
18 Paul Diesing’s How Does Social Science Work? provides a broad and in-depth look into the ever-
changing practices of social science researchers.  It also highlights the dominant philosophical-scientific 
perspectives that have directed the course and shaped the present configuration that is social science.      
19 For a comprehensive account of Verstehen, see the work of the classical sociologist Max Weber. 
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and interpretive sociologists both tended to maintain that their methods could lead to 
causal explanations.  Paul Diesing (1991) explains social science’s positivist tradition and 
offers several cautions: 
 
The main dependence for decades has been on one philosophy, logical empiricism 
or positivism, as opponents call it.  Too many researchers have learned in methods  
courses that the aim of science is to discover universal laws, and the method is to  
deduce causal hypotheses from more general theories and test them against masses  
of observable data.  This teaching has had a dogmatic certitude – that’s what science 
is; philosophers of science say so, and they know – that has not been present in many  
of the logical empiricists themselves.  The methods also fail to mention problems  
that have come up in the philosophy that have led to its continual transformation 
and virtual abandonment by 1980 (Diesing, 1991:x). 
 
Whether positivism has been ‘abandoned’ is questionable; however, critical 
epistemological challenges over the last few decades have resulted today in fewer 
positivists, and even fewer interpretive sociologists, uncritically endorsing positivism as 
the most effective means of studying social phenomena, let alone as ‘the path to truth’. 
For, “whatever philosophy [researchers] choose has its own problems or weaknesses” 
(Diesing, 1991:xi).   What is important to note is that the etiology of the contemporary 
qualitative-quantitative methodological debate can be traced directly to these early 
divisions within the discipline (Denizin, 1978; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).   
 
Just as the social sciences adopted many of the methods and techniques of the 
natural sciences, evaluation research has relied almost exclusively on the techniques of 
the methodologies of the social sciences.  In doing so, evaluation has also inherited the 
methodological disunity characteristic of the social sciences.  In its simplest form, this 
discord, commonly referred to as the quantitative-qualitative debate, represents 
vehemently defended differences of opinion over the appropriate content and manner of 
social scientific investigation.  Interestingly, insofar as the dispute is characterized as a 
unilateral attack by qualitative advocates, "it would be more appropriate to describe the 
war as a long-lasting guerilla skirmish than an all out war" (Cook, 1997:33).  Since the 
issues associated with this disunity are fundamentally the same for both the social 
sciences and evaluation research, these issues will be discussed in relation to evaluation 
research primarily. 
 
 Their respective goals, as well as the modes of achieving such goals, generally 
distinguish quantitative research and qualitative research.  On the one hand, quantitative 
research emphasizes the collection and analysis of large amounts of measurable data with 
the aim of identifying patterns and relationships through the use of statistical procedures.  
While on the other hand, qualitative research endorses methods of collecting and 
analyzing detailed, descriptive information on fewer cases with the aim of producing 
meaningful interpretations of social phenomena (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).  Sociologist 
Charles Ragin offers the following concise definitions of the two types of research:  
 
Qualitative research is a basic strategy of social research that usually involves  
in-depth examination of a relatively small number of cases.  Cases are examined  
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intensively with techniques designed to facilitate the clarification of theoretical  




Quantitative research is a basic strategy of social research that usually involves  
analysis of patterns of covariation across a large number of cases.  This approach  
focuses on variables and relationships among variables in an effort to identify  
general patterns of covariation (Ragin,1994:190). 
 
Restated, qualitative research is generally more interested in the commonalities that exist 
across a relatively small number of cases, while quantitative research seeks out 
correlation between variables given numerous cases.  Figure 2 presents some of the more 
widely used quantitative and qualitative techniques for gathering data.   
 




Quantitative – identifies patterns and correlation 
within a large number of cases 
 
 
Qualitative – identifies commonalities within a 








Statistical analysis (regression analysis, analysis 





Participant observant studies unstructured 




Historical analysis (including document review, oral 
and life histories) 
 
Textual analysis (including visual/audio analysis) 
 
Historically, the quantitative-qualitative debate has been about the most 
appropriate ways of studying social phenomena, and at its heart are the notions of 
objectivity and generalizability.  The experimental/quasi-experimental practices 
characteristic of quantitative research has in the past justified the perception that it is 
more objective than qualitative research.  However, this conception has been strongly 
contested both by academics and practicing evaluators.  The Canadian International 
Development Agency acknowledges that:  
 
It is a popular myth that information collected on quantitative indicators is  
inherently more objective than that collected on qualitative indicators.  Both  
can be either more or less objective or subjective depending on whether or not  
principles of social science research have been rigorously applied in the data  
collection and analysis process (CIDA, 1999:18). 
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Nonetheless, the prevailing view tends to associate objectivity with measurability, and 
therefore quantitative methods.  Additionally, quantitative research deals with large 
amounts of data, and is therefore considered to be more appropriate for making 
generalizations, from the study sample to the larger population.  And, since objectivity 
and generalizability are highly valued scientific ideals, qualitative research has had to 
struggle for legitimacy.20  Robert Stake explains that, with their social scientific 
backgrounds, evaluators are also more likely to value generalizations.  But he also warns 
that, because "the structure of evaluation work usually is different" (Stake, 2001:352), 
evaluation should not always be equated with the social sciences. 
 
The effects of the perceived superiority of quantitative research – on decision 
makers responsible for a program's future and on evaluators responsible to decision 
makers – is explained by Michael Quinn-Patton:   
 
Methodological rigor meant experimental designs, quantitative data, and  
sophisticated statistical analysis.  Whether decision makers understood such  
analyses was not the researcher's problem.  Validity, reliability, measurability  
and generalizability were dimensions that received the greatest attention in  
judging evaluation research proposals and reports.  Indeed, evaluators concerned  
about increasing a study's usefulness often called for ever more methodologically  
rigorous evaluations to increase the validity of the findings, thereby supposedly 
compelling decision makers to take findings seriously (Patton, 1997:16). 
 
However, in the wake of certain epistemological challenges, as well as methodological 
and analytical innovations, the sovereignty of quantitative research has come under 
serious scrutiny, and a reassessment and reappraisal of qualitative research has resulted.  
On of the more cogent critical examinations of quantitative social science can be found in 
Pablo Gonzalez Casanova’s The Fallacy of Social Science (1981).  Written during the 
early 1980’s – what might be considered the height of the qualitative-quantitative debate 
– Casanova explores the ideological underpinnings of the quantitative hegemony within 
social science.  The author explains: 
 
In the social sciences, a quantitative “style,” perspective and emphasis are related  
to many other traits of the researcher.  Generally speaking, it can be said that  
quantitative analyses are especially characteristic of the U.S. as compared to other  
countries and of younger sociologists as compared to older or impressionist ones.   
It is a style specifically linked to empiricism and the ideology of progress in the  
social sciences. And often it is only viewed from this perspective.  But as an emphasis  
and perspective, quantitative style is also associated with political position.  The  
researchers choice of style corresponds to political position regarding the social  
system and the status quo (Casanova, 1981: 10).    
 
Casanova’s observations coincide with the shifting perspectives about the function and 
value of quantitative and qualitative research practices.  On the one hand, the expansion 
during the 1980's of 'postmodern' reasoning critically questioned many of science's sacred 
                                                          
20 For example, see the National of Academy of Science's criteria for quality research in Gueron and Pauly, 
1991. 
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ideals (in particular, the notion of objectivity), as well as the legitimacy of conventional 
avenues of 'knowing'.  This movement enabled and embraced new methods of 
investigation and interpretation.  On the other hand, methodological and analytic 
advances (including the new computer software for qualitative analysis) challenged the 
idea that qualitative research was unable to produce measurable 'scientific' results (for 
example, see Lawrence Mohr's The Qualitative Method of Impact Analysis, 1999).  But 
even with these advances, it is generally maintained that "[in] the same way that they 
cannot answer complex questions of frequency and magnitude, qualitative field studies 
are not designed to provide definitive answers to causal questions" (Lofland and Lofland, 
1995:136).  Still, even this generally accepted notion has had detractors.  Lawrence Mohr 
(1999) explains that determining causality has traditionally relied on one epistemological 
procedure, that of the counterfactual method (i.e., designing approaches that enable us to 
show what would have happened to Y if X did not occur).  And, he maintains that this 
method can not be employed when using qualitative designs.  However, he proposes an 
alternative epistemological approach, involving qualitative data, for determining 
causation:   
 
[Q]ualitative research to determine the cause of intentional human behaviors,  
such as whether or not those behaviors were induced by a program being evaluated,  
must involve a search for the operative reasons behind the behaviors.  In most  
cases this would undoubtedly involve obtaining information from the subjects  
whose behavior is at issue.  Given that operative reasons are unaware, that is not  
necessarily all that one must do.  It might be necessary to obtain information from  
many other people, from documents, and from the histories of relevant events.   
These are methods, however, that are familiar in social science, especially in  
such areas as history, anthropology, and area studies (Mohr, 1999:75). 
 
Mohr posits that the 'operative reason behind people's behaviour' can be ascertained, 
cross-referenced for validity, and analyzed in such a way as to provide adequate causal 
explanations.  One obvious weakness in Mohr's conceptualization of causality involves 
generalizability.  Although his 'causal reasoning' may be able to explain what led to what, 
it is doubtful that such an approach to causation could lead to generalizations about X and 
Y.  To be sure, although attempts are made, qualitative research is generally perceived to 
be inappropriate for generating causal inferences of social phenomena.  Therefore, a more 
important question might be – What are qualitative studies designed for?  
 
As explained, quantitative methods allow large quantities of data to be statistically 
analyzed, and correlation and covariation between variables demonstrated.  But many 
social researchers are unsatisfied with this approach, especially when the intention of a 
study is not to measure covariation but to enhance understanding about some facet of 
social life.  Qualitative analysis is more interested in answering why some events occur 
the way they do, than in attempting to show that a given change in a particular 
independent variable is statistically likely to 'cause' a given change in a specific 
dependent variable.  Thus, for example, if a study is solely interested in measuring the 
change in a specific outcome variable after the introduction of a given intervention, 
quantitative methods may be most appropriate.  On the other hand, if the study aims to 
enhance understanding of why and in which ways the intervention affected the lives of 
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recipients, the preferred method will be qualitative (Patton, 2002). Additionally, Thomas 
Cook (1997) provides some useful advice on the applications of qualitative methods: 
 
Few quantitative researchers would disagree with such a maxim as these: Qualitative  
methods are very useful for making explicit the theory behind a program; for  
understanding the context in which a program operates; for describing what is  
actually implemented in a program; for assessing the correspondence between  
what the program theory promised and what is actually implemented; for helping  
to elucidate the processes that might have brought about program effects; for  
identifying some likely unintended consequences of the program; for learning how  
to get the program results used; or for synthesizing the wisdom learned about the  
program or a set of programs with somewhat similar characteristics (Cook, 1997:34).        
 
And, according to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), evaluators 
require qualitative methods because without them they are unable to "properly assess the 
projects, due to lack of qualitative information on what was actually taking place in the 
project…" (Kuji-Shikatani, 1995:19).  Qualitative methods are often seen as favorable 
insofar as they can be designed to meet the specifications and needs of evaluation, and 
can be performed swiftly and efficiently. And, by including stakeholders' subjective 
viewpoints about the effects of the intervention, qualitative research can substantiate and 
qualify the findings of impact evaluation.  Furthermore, some have argued that qualitative 
methods are better suited for evaluation in that they are more likely to be sensitive to the 
conditions associated with social programs (Shaw, 1999).  And, in response to the 
critique that qualitative methods are 'unscientific', Judy Baker maintains that, "[t]he 
validity and reliability of qualitative data are highly dependent on the methodological 
skill, sensitivity, and training of the evaluator" (Baker, 2000:8).  That is to say, just as 
different quantitative researchers possess varying degrees of methodological ‘know-
how’, the ability of qualitative researchers to appropriately employ sophisticated methods 
will depend on the knowledge and experience of the researcher; and, will determine the 
degree of analytical rigor. 
 
While quantitative and qualitative proponents have a history of fervent 
engagement, Thomas Cook argues that, "[t]he case for qualitative methods does not 
depend on attacking the foundations of quantitative methods; it rests on their utility for 
answering important evaluation questions either when used alone or when used together 
with quantitative methods" (Cook, 1997:35).  The recent ascent of qualitative studies has 
not meant a depreciation of quantitative research.  On the contrary, applied and scholarly 
research continues to be dominated by quantitative methods.  (This may be especially 
true in the case of publicly and privately funded applied research, as opposed to 
‘academic’ research.)   
 
At present, what monitoring that might take place is largely limited to the  
recording of the numbers of people trained, or the amount of information or  
training materials produced, in other words, the 'quantity.'  The 'quality' of programs  
- quality of learning, training, or support systems - often remains unknown.  This  
is complicated further by the unfortunate reliance on numbers as a manifestation  
of effectiveness.  Project continuation and job availability often drive a need to  
achieve an 'impressive' record.  Programme personnel may believe that they must  
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produce quantitative reports, rather than to merely describe what is taking place in  
a simple narrative format.  The qualitative knowledge that could be accumulated  
over a program's life remains obscure, and opportunities for effective intervention  
are often lost.  The loss of qualitative knowledge is a serious one… (Kuji-Shikatani,  
1995:9). 
 
Matching research methodology with the specifics of the given research subject – 
as well as with the interests and agenda of the investigator – has helped to generate 
innovative methodological strategies.  In an effort to provide a more comprehensive, 
detailed and valid explanation of the given subject, projects are increasingly using 
multiple methodological techniques (Denzin, 1978; Ragin, 1997; McMahon, 2001).  This 
procedure is commonly referred to as mixed methods or methodological pluralism or 
methodological triangulation.  Research specialist Norman Denzin explains that: 
 
The rationale for this strategy is that the flaws of one method are often the strength  
of another; and by combining methods, observers can achieve the best of each  
while overcoming their unique deficiencies… When a hypothesis can survive  
the confrontation of a series of complementary methods of testing it contains a  
degree of validity unattainable by one tested within the more constricted framework  
of a single method… methodological triangulation involves a complex process of  
playing each method off against the other so as to maximize the validity of field  
efforts.  Assessment cannot be solely derived from principles given in research manuals  
- it is an emergent process, contingent on the investigator, the research setting, and  
the investigator's theoretical perspective (Denzin, 1978: 308-310).  
 
Multiple methods have been used in evaluation research for more than three decades; 
today it is common for evaluations to apply more than one method for a single study.  
The US development agency, USAID, acknowledges that, "[in] practice, designs may 
sometimes combine different approaches, either to improve persuasiveness or to answer 
different questions” (USAID, 1997:4). 
 
Mixed method designs are considered especially useful in answering questions 
about formative evaluation, such as process and implementation questions. Lois-ellin 
Datta explains that, "[i]t has become almost standard to look to case studies combined 
with document analysis in evaluating implementation" (1997:347).  However, it is only 
very recently that mixed methods are applied to summative evaluation in which the 
outcomes, results, and effects of a given intervention are sought after.  Moreover, what 
one typically finds in evaluation research is, for example, a mix of interview and 
document data, but seldom is there a "close integration of a full case study with other 
methods" (Datta, 1997:347).  Both within the social sciences generally and in evaluation 
research particularly, triangulation has proven to effective means of reducing the 
uncertainty about the finding of any one method alone.   In her analysis of numerous 
studies related to female empowerment within the international development context, 
Naila Kabeer explains: 
 
The important methodological point brought out is the critical need to triangulate or  
cross-check the evidence provided by an indicator in order to establish that it means  
what it is believed to mean.  Indicators compress not only a great deal of information  
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Over the last several decades, qualitative methods have steadily gained ground as 
legitimate research – both within the social sciences generally and evaluation particularly 
– moving away from its place of origin on the margins of what is considered credible 
research.  Today, depending on the interests of the researcher as well as the 
characteristics of her/his subject, projects may be quantitative or qualitative in the main, 
or may employ a healthy mix of methods.  Nevertheless, as will be illustrated, the belief 
in the union between quantitative methodology and causal explanation has helped to 
maintain the separation of and opposition between quantitative and qualitative research – 






ATTRIBUTION IN AID EVALUATION REASERCH 
 
The evaluation subject is indeed hard to define, and what is more, evaluation practice is 
a complicated endeavour.  Not surprisingly evaluation designers, evaluators and end-
users are faced with a multitude of problems, for example, problems of establishing 
causality between the effects observed and the intervention being studied.  
 
– Claus Rebien, 1996 
 
Despite the measurement difficulty, attribution is a problem that cannot be ignored when 
trying to assess the performance of government programs.  Without an answer to this 
question, little can be said about the worth of the program; nor can advice be provided 
about future directions.  
 
– John Mayne, 1999 
 
[D]etermining attribution…is typically the most difficult, yet the most important, issues 
addressed in evaluation.  
 




The preceding sections outline the general conditions and concerns associated 
with causal attribution within social research.  They illustrate that, in practice, causation 
is always 'probabilistic' and therefore refers to correlation and covariation between 
variables.  They reveal the problematic nature of experimentation within the social 
sciences, especially in terms of threats to internal validity.  And, they show how 
quantitative and qualitative methods tend to serve different research objectives, but can 
be complimentary.  Additionally, the review exposes the dynamic character of evaluation 
research – how the purposes and types of evaluation continue to evolve.  Despite the 
difficulties associated with 'proving' attribution, the demand to demonstrate the effects of 
interventions and to account for actions taken and resources allocated continues to drive 
professional evaluation, impelling researchers to develop innovative new methods and 
designs.  As Terry Smutylo explains, "donors are increasingly basing funding decisions 
on their recipients' abilities to demonstrate 'impact'…  Methodologically, this requires 
isolating key factors that cause the desired results and attributing them to particular 
agency or set of activities" (2001:4).   
 
In order to explain how evaluation research has confronted the attribution 
question, two interrelated sub-areas are presented: 
  
1. The heterogeneity of evaluation research – Attribution is explored in terms of 
different research sectors, as well as the different levels of intervention and analysis.  
Specifically, how does the research sector and level of intervention and analysis 
affect the possibilities of attributing causes and effects within evaluation?   
 34 
 
2. Models & approaches – Attribution is discussed in relation to historically changing 
conceptual models and approaches.  Three stages are discussed (early evaluation, 
shifting paradigms, and the road ahead).  Professional (frontline and academic) 
recommendations and cautions are provided in relation to the feasibility of attribution 
at each stage.  
 
 35 
THE HETEROGENEITY OF EVALUATION RESEARCH  
 
By now it should be clear that evaluation research practice is both dynamic and 
varied.  As previously illustrated, evaluation has expanded and transformed over its fifty-
year history, diversifying in design and practice.  As a result of the field's diversity and 
dynamism, evaluation remains without a uniform framework or standard set of operating 
procedures:21  "There is no single well-developed evaluation methodology which is 
universally applied.  When dealing with similar projects, practice varies among agencies, 
from sector to sector and within the same agency and the same sector" (Rebien, 1996:55).  
Instead, evaluation is recognized by its heterogeneity and is defined in terms of its 
multiple purposes and categories (recall Rebien's definition).  Accordingly, attribution 
questions are typically associated with a distinct category of evaluation research with a 
particular purpose – those that are focused on measuring 'impact' and demonstrating 
'accountability'.  This is not to suggest that only impact evaluations are interested in 
attribution, or that impact evaluations attribute 'causes' and 'effects' without complication.  
Certainly, "one of the most problematic parts of impact assessment is determining 
causality, because in real life, a combination of several factors is likely to have caused 
any observed change" (Roche, 1999:32).  Moreover, the feasibility of attribution may be 
affected more by the particular subject matter under investigation and by the evaluation's 
unique design and methodology, than by the category or purpose of the evaluation per se.  
One way to understand why some types of evaluations are better structured to answer 





Specialized areas of evaluation research are commonly referred to as sectors. 
According to the DAC Working Group on Aid Evaluation, "[a] sector includes 
development activities commonly grouped together for the purpose of public action such 
as health, education, agriculture, transport etc." (OECD, 2002:35).  An evaluation sector 
typically implies a concentration of experience, theoretical knowledge and skill within a 
specific substantive research area.  To be sure, no one sector is fully separated from other 
sectors.  In practice, for example, health and medicine, science and technology, 
education, and transportation will all influence each other under certain circumstances.  
Moreover, some sectors are broadly defined, encompassing multiple sub-sectors.  This is 
the case for the development assistance sector.  Therefore, for heuristic purposes, a more 
simplistic delineation is adopted: Evaluation research sectors may be characterized 
dichotomously as dealing primarily with 'simple' systems or dealing primarily with 
'complex' systems.22  The simple-complex system dichotomy provides the conceptual 
frame to help interpret which types of sector are more likely to ask attribution questions, 
and which are more likely to be able to answer them.  
 
                                                          
21 Interestingly, insofar as non-uniformity is equated with flexibility, some see this as evaluation's heralding 
feature. 
22 While this dichotomy is an analytical artifice and in practice no such precise delineation exists, it is often 
suggested that, "[e]valuation research usually deals with complex social phenomena" (Kuchler, 1981:168). 
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“Simple” systems within the research sector 
 
Evaluation sectors that deal primarily with non-human/non-social environments 
within which interventions that can be isolated, manipulated, and measured are often 
labeled simple systems.  These types of sectors tend to be more likely to ask, and more 
compatible of answering, attribution questions.  For example, an impact evaluation within 
the agricultural sector might be able to attribute change in crop yield after the 
introduction of a particular intervention (e.g., new technology, agricultural practice, or 
fertilizer, et cetera).  Hypothesis testing methodologies are generally most appropriate for 
the analysis of the effects of an intervention within the simple system sectors.   As 
previously explained, this approach "stresses quasi-experimental research designs – 
including large-scale statistical analysis and controlled-case comparisons – that 
supposedly permit control of confounding variables, allow for variance on selected 
dependent and independent variables, and permit the disaggregation of the relative causal 
“weigh” of different independent variables” (Homer-Dixon, 1996:146).  While 
appropriate for simple systems, these methods are seldom sensitive to the dynamics and 
logic of complex systems. 
 
 
“Complex” systems within the research sector 
 
Evaluation sectors that deal primarily with complex human/social systems rest at 
the other end of the continuum.  These systems are:  
 
characterized by an immense number of unknown variables and unknown causal  
connections between these variables, by interactions, feedbacks, and nonlinear  
relationships, and by high sensitivity to small perturbations.  Such complexities  
and uncertainties make it virtually impossible to choose cases that control for  
potentially confounding variables (Homer-Dixon, 1996:134).   
 
Interventions within complex systems are embedded in, and affected by, the uniqueness 
of time and place.  Furthermore, unlike simple systems, the variables comprising and 
influencing these systems are highly obscure to researchers, as well as being extremely 
"sensitive to small perturbations – characteristics that can altogether overwhelm both 
statistical and controlled-comparison methods” (Homer-Dixon, 1996:146).  Insofar as 
multiple and often unknown confounding variables are the norm, complex systems 
present a serious obstacle for attribution: "These characteristics often render moot 
questions about the weighing, or relative strength, of specific causal variables” (Homer-
Dixon, 1996:146). Evaluating aid development interventions, for example, is notoriously 
difficult because it ordinarily deals with distinct and rapidly changing conditions, which 
significantly affect research validity and reliability.   
 
Often, a program is only one of many influences on an outcome.  In fact, deciding  
how much the outcome is truly attributable to the program, rather than to other  
influences, may be the most challenging task in evaluation study (Treasury Board  
of Canada, 24). 
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Additionally, Anne Whyte compares complex systems to communities, both of which are 
always in a state of transition: "Projects implemented in these systems are likely to have 
unexpected and decidedly stochastic outcomes" (Whyte, 2000:6).  Moreover, attempts to 
measure the outcome of interventions within complex systems through causal modeling 
have been strongly criticized (see W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 1998; Lusthaus, C. et al. 
2000; Whyte, 2000; Patton, 2001).  And, as Pawson and Tilley explain: 
 
It is precisely because of this need to explain human actions in terms of their  
location within different layers of social reality that realists shun the secessionist  






Evaluation expert Michael Quinn-Patton offers sage advice on the nature of complex 
systems and the kind of methods most suited for understanding them: 
 
[T]he complex world of human beings cannot be fully captured and understood  
by simply adding up carefully measured and fully analyzed parts.  At the systems  
level (the whole program, the whole farm, the whole family, the whole organization,  
the whole community), there is a qualitative difference in the kind of thinking that is  
required to make sense of what is happening.  Qualitative inquiry facilitates that  
qualitative difference in understanding human or 'purposeful systems' (2001:122). 
 
Indeed, complex systems present serious challenges when trying to isolate and measure 
the effects of a given intervention; and in terms of attributing results, they are generally 
seen as problematic.  Of course, in practice one finds that the diverse research activities 
of any given sector may involve both complex and simple systems.  Nonetheless, 
interventions within some sectors (such as, aid evaluation) are more likely to be 
embedded in, and deeply affected by, the complexity of human/social systems.  The 
following chart provides an ideal typical representation of the relationship between type 
of sector and feasibility of answering attribution questions.    
 
 
Attribution & Sector 
(simple vs. complex)














In the same way that the sector affects the ability of evaluators to demonstrate the 
results of an intervention, the level of the intervention and analysis will significantly 
influence the feasibility of attributing results.  At the implementation phase, the 
complexity of the intervention will partly determine the extent to which attribution 
questions can be answered.  And, "the magnitude of this problem will vary widely with 
the type of program and result being considered" (Treasury Board of Canada, 6).   Here 
again, it is useful to organize levels of intervention on a continuum from 'simple' project-
level interventions to 'comprehensive' program-level interventions.  This helps to 
differentiate between narrower research interventions whose effects tend to be measured 
over the short-term and broad research interventions whose effects are measured over the 
long-term.  
 
To clarify, simple project-level interventions refer to single initiatives, with 
explicit objectives, carried out within a short time frame.  The DAC Working Group on 
Aid Evaluation defines aid evaluation at the project level as: "Evaluation of an individual 
development intervention designed to achieve specific objectives within specified 
resources and implementation schedules, often within the framework of a broader 
program" (OECD, 2002:30-31).23  Insofar as project level interventions are relatively 
isolatable and have clearly specified objectives, attributing effects at this level tends to be 
less problematic.  For example, measuring the effects of mosquito nets on the incidence 
of malaria in a small rural village is likely to be less complicated than trying to determine 
the effects of early childhood education programs on child poverty throughout a region.  
(This is not to suggest that attribution of project level interventions is without 
difficulties.)  At the other end of the continuum are comprehensive program-level 
interventions.  Program level interventions are characterized in terms of their extensive 
range and scope; generally program-level interventions encompass a variety of activities 
and initiatives, generally over a longer duration.24 The following definition of evaluation 
at the program level within the development assistance context helps to clarify: 
 
a set of interventions, marshaled to attain specific global, regional, country,  
or sector development objectives.  A development program is a time bound  
intervention involving multiple activities that may cut across sectors, themes  
and/or geographic areas (OECD, 2002:30).  
 
Therefore, whereas the certainty of attribution is higher for 'simple' project-level 
interventions, the complex nature of 'comprehensive' program-level interventions makes 
inferring causation at this level of analysis extremely difficult, if possible at all. As John 
                                                          
23 "Cost benefit analysis is a major instrument of project evaluation for projects with measurable benefits.  
When benefits cannot be quantified, cost effectiveness is a suitable approach" (OECD, 2002:30-31). 
24 It is important to recognize that development programs "frequently take many years to bear fruit.  The 
“hothouse”, 2-3 year funding approach, rarely produces honest successes" (Staudt, 1991:114). 
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Mayne points out, any number of external variables can confound effects at the program 
level:   
 
In most cases, there are many other factors at play in addition to the impact of the  
program's activities.  Such things as other government actions and programs,  
economic factors, social trends, and the like can all have an effect on outcomes  
(1999:3). 
 
Even the attempt to attribute the outcome of, for example, a 'simple' project to reduce 
malaria incidents through a mosquito net intervention may be complicated by the 
influence of uncontrollable, and often unknown, factors such as environmental change, 
disaster, or conflict.  This is equally the case at the 'comprehensive' program level.  
Again, this is not to imply that ‘project’ level research is free of complexity, or that the 
depth of complexity at the ‘program’ level renders evaluation of programs impossible.  
Simply, insofar as the scope is generally narrower (fewer stakeholders, limited resources 
and timeframe) and the purpose more specific (limited and clear objectives) for project-
level interventions, evaluation at the program level will encounter considerable 
challenges.  So, for example, reliably demonstrating the impacts of a broad health 
promotion program may be far less feasible than measuring the outcomes of a malaria 
reduction project.  The following corporate perspective recognizes the challenges 
associated with attributing the effects of comprehensive programs: 
 
Cause and effect can be especially hard to measure in research on comprehensive  
initiatives.  The complexity of these initiatives and the contexts in which they  
occur often makes it difficult for evaluators and researchers to establish causal  
relationships between programs inputs and participant outcomes.  A control or  
comparison group, which could show causality, may not be available for every 
comprehensive initiative.  And data collected through qualitative and quantitative  
methods may indicate different (even contradictory) causal relationships (Anne E.  
Cassie). 
 
And, the W. K. Kellogg Foundation reiterates the problems and implications of 
attempting to establish attribution using research practices that are modeled after the 
natural sciences (i.e., experimentation and quantification): 
   
[M]any of the criteria necessary to conduct these evaluations limit their usefulness  
to primarily single intervention programs in fairly controlled environments.  The  
natural science research model is therefore ill equipped to help us understand  
complex, comprehensive, and collaborative community initiatives (W.K. Kellogg  
Foundation, 1998:6). 
 
That is to say, where attribution – identifying and measuring the precise effects of an 
intervention – is the principal goal for evaluation, researchers may be limited to 








In addition to the problems associated with attribution at different intervention 
levels, the level of evaluation analysis will also generate difficulties in terms of 
attribution.  The evaluation analysis of an intervention may involve different level of 
analysis.  One means of organizing these levels is in terms of outputs, outcomes and 
impacts.  The United Nation (UNDP) explains that outputs are the "tangible products 
(including services) of a program or project that are necessary to achieve its objectives" 
(UNDP).  And, outputs "may also include changes resulting from the intervention which 
are relevant to the achievement of outcomes" (OECD, 2002:16).  Outputs tend to refer to 
immediate the results of an intervention, making attribution at this level of analysis 
relatively uncomplicated.  Moving from outputs to outcomes increases the level of 
complexity.  Outcomes are defined as "[t]he likely or achieved short-term and medium-
term effects of an intervention’s outputs" (OECD, 2002:16).  And, outcome effect refers 
to "the more immediate tangible and observable change in relation to the initial situation 
and established objectives, which it is felt has been brought about as a direct result of the 
project" (Oakley, et al., 1998:35).  This level of analysis is generally associated with 
short-term results, decreasing the certainty of attribution.  Finally, at the impact level, 
evaluation is concerned with demonstrating the "[p]ositive and negative, primary and 
secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or 
indirectly, intended or unintended" (OECD, 2002:22).  This level of analysis deals with 
long-term effects and, insofar as many of these changes may be 'unplanned' or 
'unintended', attribution will be least feasible.  Impact level analysis is incompatible for 
addressing attribution in that their precise effect tends to be vague and the changes 
generally evolve slowly over time (den Heyer, 2001:26).  Additionally, as the evaluation 
moves from analysis at the outputs level, to the outcomes level, to the impact level, the 
reliability of the program's theory (which hypothesizes how the intervention will effect 
change) will weaken, and the certainty of attribution will diminish (Luukkonen, 
1998:602; den Heyer, 2001).  
 
The emphasis on accountability and the demand to demonstrate the causal 
relations between interventions and results has profoundly affected the shape of aid 
evaluation, compelling evaluation to focus on simple project, output or outcome level 
analyses:  
 
The need for more accountability, which seems to be a major rationale for the  
increased attention to impact assessment, encourages a focus on the project level  
and on being able to attribute impacts at the same level. (James, 2001: 7). 
 
Mayne reiterates this view pointing to the “reluctance to accept accountability for results 




The ability to attribute results is negatively associated with the complexity of the 
research sector, as well as the comprehensiveness of the intervention and analysis.  And, 
insofar as aid evaluation tends to involves comprehensive program-level analysis, this 
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'complex' sector is particularly prone to the problems associated with attribution (i.e., 
attributing the results of comprehensive program-level interventions within a complex 
system sector).  Aware of this problem, evaluators have been critical of the utility of 
'conventional' impact evaluation approaches which tend to be more appropriate for 
evaluating simple projects within simple systems.  And, evaluators are beginning to 
acknowledge and address the gap between 'conventional' evaluation methodologies and 
the complexity of the intervention (sector and analysis): "[T]raditional evaluation models 
do no necessarily deal with adaptive, complex systems, which is what human 
communities and social-information systems are” (Whyte, 2000).25    
 
Additionally, in a report on program evaluation methods, the Treasury Board of 
Canada offers the following warning when attempting to attribute specific effects to a 
given social intervention:  
 
It is only possible to generalize from the evaluation-determined results of a  
program if the program itself can be replicated.  If the program is specific to  
a particular time, place or set of circumstances, then it becomes problematic  
to draw credible inferences about what would happen if the program were  
elsewhere under different circumstances (Treasury Board of Canada, 13).   
 
Insofar as development assistance interventions are characteristically 'specific to time, 
place and set of circumstances', evaluating such interventions indeed will pose 
difficulties.  This is particularly germane for aid evaluations driven by the need to 
demonstrate accountability and attribution. The following chart provides an ideal typical 
representation of the relationship between level of intervention and ability to answer 





                                                          
25 See also the World Bank report Assessing Aid (1998) for an up-to-date, empirically grounded discussion 
of the far-reaching impact of international aid, as well as the difficulties associated with measuring impact. 
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MODELS & APPROACHES  
 
The study of alternative evaluation approaches is important for professionalizing 
program evaluation and for its scientific advancement and operation.  Professional, 
careful study of program evaluation approaches can help evaluators discredit 
approaches that violate sound principles of evaluation and legitimize and strengthen 
those that follow the principles. 
 
              – Daniel L. Stufflebeam, 2001 
 
A hammer is a wonderful tool.  But it is not appropriate for all situations.  Similarly, 
there is no one perfect method which can be used in all situations to document program 
impact.  One of the many contributions of Donald T. Campbell to evaluation was in 
demonstrating that all methods are flawed.  The best way to control for the limitations of 
any single method is by using a combination of complimentary methods. 
 
– Burt Perrin, 1998 
 
 
Aware of the general problems involved in attributing results to 'comprehensive' 
interventions within the 'complex' development assistance sector, it is now possible to 
explore how different models confront the attribution question.  This requires a survey of 
the different key evaluation designs and approaches that have been employed within the 
field of aid evaluation during its short history.  Rather than an exhaustive typology, the 
following explores the most prominent and influential approaches, sorting them 
chronologically by category: early evaluation, shifting paradigms, and the road ahead.   
Starting with 'conventional' (or 'traditional') evaluation, strengths and weakness are 
exposed with an emphasis on the exhibiting the incompatibilities of some models for 
evaluating development assistance interventions.  Particular attention is given to the 
positivist character of 'conventional' evaluation, and to the potentialities and problems 
associated with the ubiquitous Logical Framework Approach (LFA) specifically. 
Following, a review of the transitional phase (referred to herein as the 'qualitative turn'), 
which saw 'conventional' methodologies challenged and new ones embraced, looks at the 
significance of this shift from the attribution perspective.  And finally, the attribution 
problem will be discussed in terms of the 'future course' of evaluation research.  Expert 
recommendations will shed light on the 'new horizon' of aid evaluation, displaying 
options for addressing the problems involved in attributing results.  As is evident from 
the literature, the more recent models are generally interpreted as responses to the 
deficiencies of earlier designs; however, in practice they are often used in conjunction 
with tradition approaches.  Therefore, looking at the current state of the discipline, one 
finds an expanding assortment of designs and approaches, techniques and methods.  
Several critical questions will guide this 'purposeful' typology:  
 
 Are some evaluation approaches and designs more effective for attributing results?  




These questions will be addressed by looking at the transformations in aid evaluation 
approaches and designs over the last several decades. 
 
Prior to examining specific evaluation models, it is worth delineating different 
broad classifications of evaluation research.  Basil Cracknell offers a 'taxonomy of aid 
evaluation' representing different stages in the 'life of a project'.  Writing from the 
development assistance perspective, Cracknell explains that "an evaluation can take place 
any time after an activity has actually commenced, and many different types of 
evaluation have come into being, representing different stages in a project's life" 
(Cracknell, 2000:69). Although a detailed account of each stage will not be provided 
here, a brief review of each is useful.26    
 
Baseline Studies: Though not considered evaluation per se, Cracknell acknowledges the 
importance of "a detailed review of the situation immediately before the development 
activity starts" (Cracknell, 2000:69).  Baseline studies collect critical 'benchmark' 
information about the project's context that will be needed at later stages in the 
evaluation.  It is worth noting that, while baseline data can provide vital information for 
measuring subsequent change, critics have pointed out the problematic nature of baseline 
studies.  Particularly, the researcher may collect baseline data on variables that will later 
prove to be insignificant; and more likely, during the course of the project the researcher 
may discover that other, unidentified variables for which no baseline data exists, are in 
fact significant (see Roche, 1999:74-79 for a critic as well as recommendations for 
reducing the problems).   
 
On-going Evaluation: Because projects may encounter unforeseen obstacles and 
problems, it is often necessary to carry out an 'interim' evaluation.  This is typically 
conducted by some outside agent, allowing an unbiased, fresh perspective.  On-going 
evaluation is sometimes referred to as 'mid-term review', 'interim evaluation', or 
'formative evaluation', and is necessary for the success of later comprehensive impact 
evaluations (Cracknell, 2000:71-72). 
 
Inter-phase Evaluation: While some agencies sponsor and evaluate long-term programs, 
"others agencies prefer to split programmes, comprising a number of projects which may 
be spread out over many years, into a series of phases" (Cracknell, 2000:72).  As such, no 
new project will be funded until the success of the preceding project has been established.  
This practice is known as 'inter-phase evaluation'.  
 
Built-in Evaluation: This involves setting up the evaluation at the same time as the 
project is being planned.  This will allow personnel an understanding of what is expected 
from the project, and will facilitate baseline data (if needed).  However, built-in 
                                                          
26 The literature abounds with typologies of evaluation models and approaches with only slight differences 
in categorization.  For a broad and general review, see Daniel Stufflebeam's monograph Evaluation Models 
(2001); and for a typology more specific to impact evaluation, see Chris Roches' Historical Overview of 
Impact Assessment (Roche, 1999:18-20).  Also, Molly den Heyer (2001) puts forward a six-part taxonomy 
based on knowledge construction and knowledge use.    
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evaluation has been also considered "a waste of time because no one can possibly foretell 
what will happen in the future since development is a dynamic process" (Cracknell, 
2000:73).  
 
Self-Evaluation: This type of evaluation "implies that the operational staff evaluate their 
own activities" (Cracknell, 2000:73).  While self-evaluations are more at risk of being 
non-objective, they may be the most efficient and effective means of evaluating 
numerous small projects spread throughout one or more countries.  
 
Ex Post Evaluation: This term came out of the "need to distinguish the process of looking 
retrospectively at projects from the process of assessing the feasibility of proposed new 
projects" (Cracknell, 2000:74).  Ex post evaluation typically takes place after the project 
has been fully implemented; it is also known as 'in-operation evaluation' and 'maturity 
evaluation'. 
 
Impact Evaluation: The importance of impact evaluation emerged, during the early days 
of aid evaluation, out of a growing awareness that the results of evaluations conducted 
shortly after implementation were significantly different from the long term results.  
Consequently, "the emphasis switched more toward evaluations carried out some years 
after project implementation, that is, impact evaluation" (Cracknell, 2000:74-75).     
 
Internal and External Evaluation: Though much confusion surrounds these terms, 
internal and external evaluation tends to refer to the personnel engaged in the evaluation 
research.  Personnel from within the funding/donor agency typically conduct internal 
evaluations; as such, built-in evaluation is often associated with internal evaluation. 
Evaluators from outside the agency, however, generally conduct external evaluations. 
(Cracknell, 2000:75). 
 
It has been suggested that, in recent years, development assistance has fallen under 
increased pressure to evaluate impacts.  Scarcity of funds has meant that donors are more 
interested in seeing the results of projects and programs, discovering what works and 
what does not for the organization (known as 'institutional learning'), investing in 
'sustainable' projects and programs, and being more accountable to the target group 
(Oakley et al., 1998).  Outside of baseline studies, the problems associated with 




Early Models: Conventional Evaluation 
 
The research practices of early aid evaluators reflect the ‘kind’ of aid that 
predominate early international assistance; aid initiatives emphasized economic support 
and growth, and quantitative research approaches were the norm.    
 
For several decades ‘development’ was understood to be essentially an economic 
activity; the modernization theorists of the 1950s and 1960s believed it to be  
synonymous with per capita growth, industrialization and economic indicators.   
But in 1962 the UN Economic and Social Council argued that ‘development’ is  
growth plus ‘change’; change in turn is social and cultural and it is both ‘quantitative 
and qualitative’” (Peter Oakley, et al., 1998:7). 
 
During this period, evaluators attempting to attribute results to development interventions 
tended to use experimental/quasi-experimental methods; and, in their quest for an 
effective, systematic means of measuring outcomes, developed and adopted a variety of 
evaluation models and designs.  To the extent that these early approaches are 
quantitatively orientated, and insofar as the 'logic' of their designs relies on rational linear 
causal modeling assumptions, these models will be referred to as 'conventional' 
evaluation.27 The ensuing looks the quantitative dominion within early evaluation, and at 
the relation between 'conventional' evaluation and the attribution question with and 
emphasis on the Logical Framework Approach (LFA).   
 
 
POSITIVISM REVISITED: THE QUANTITATIVE DOMINION  
 
The legacy of professional evaluation is rooted in research designs that attempt to 
demonstrate causal relationships between variables (i.e., that aim to measure the outcome 
effect of specific interventions).  As has been shown, attributing cause and effect using 
'conventional' evaluation typically employed positivist, experimental approaches:   
 
This methodology required that statistically representative sample surveys be taken  
as the baseline and periodically over the project's lifetime in order to track changes 
in outcomes (e.g., living standards, incomes, mortality rates, etc.) among project  
beneficiaries and control groups, and to prove scientifically that benefits were caused  
by the project (Binnendijk, 1990:168). 
 
Experimentation and quasi-experimentation had promised "unbiased, precise estimates of 
the causal consequences of programs or their major constituent parts" (Cook, 1997:32).  
It is this promise of 'truth and 'objectivity' that has helped to maintain the dominance of 
quantitative methods within evaluation research today.  To be sure, the discipline 
continues to be guided by a powerful belief in the value of the positivist project. 
Furthermore, while recent years have witnessed a wave of dissent challenging the status 
of positivism, the contemporary view from the field tends to reiterate the importance of 
positivistic, experimentally based evaluation methods:  
                                                          
27 This description is meant to provide a general distinction between so-called 'hard' models (i.e., 
quantitative) and 'soft' models (i.e., primarily qualitative).  
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experimental designs are especially useful in addressing evaluation questions about  
the effectiveness and impact of programs… [And that,] experimental designs increase  
our confidence that observed outcomes are the result of a given program or innovation 
instead of a function of extraneous variables or events (Gribbon and Herman, 1997).   
 
Today, Canadian, U.S., and European government and non-government agencies 
involved in evaluation research continue to employ positivistic/quantitative evaluation 
practices (den Heyer, 2001).  And, evaluator Finn Hansson remarks that in Denmark 
evaluation research practices are "still deeply anchored in positivist (or neopositivist) 
empiricist data collection in which survey research predominates" (1997:186). But, 
guided both by the ethos of social scientific 'constructivist' epistemology and the accounts 
of practical experiences, aid evaluators have been quick to recognize the limits of 
positivist approaches.  Without restating the many epistemological and methodological 
problems associated with positivism generally, suffice it to say not all evaluators share 
the same degree of faith in the positivist promise.   
 
Among the many critiques of quantitative methods within evaluation is the view 
that such methods are only appropriate for answering certain kinds of questions.  
Specifically, quantitative methods are indeed useful for generating generalizations, from 
large amounts of empirical data, about multivariate relationships; however, they may 
have limited utility for answering questions that are central to aid evaluation.  
Specifically, "[quantitative methods] do not typically shed any light on why a program 
worked or did not work" (HRDC, 1998).  And, although new advances in quantitative 
research design and data analysis are thought to address a broader range of questions with 
higher validity and reliability, the sophistication of the procedures needed to meet the 
prerequisites for establishing causality often make them "quite difficult to implement in 
field situations" (Lofland and Lofland, 1995:137).  In addition, they tend to be very costly 
and time consuming and, therefore, are ineffectual for evaluating characteristically under 
funded aid interventions within a short timeframe.  Moreover, even if such techniques 
were to be employed in 'field' situations, they typically require a level of technical skill 
and expert knowledge that may not be available 'in the field' (Cracknell, 2000).   
 
From early on, evaluators have recognized the limitations of 'conventional' 
evaluation which has been described as ‘inadequate and misleading’ (Rebien, 1996:55). 
Annette Bennendijk discusses the 'methodological weaknesses' of comprehensive 
selection of international development evaluations conducted during the 1970s, the 
heyday of 'conventional' evaluation.  She suggest that: 
 
attempting to apply experimental design standards to real-life development project  
situations where ransom assignments of treatments (e.g. project services) is typically 
infeasible and the alternative quasi-experimental design of carefully matching groups  
based on important characteristics is difficult to the point of being impractical.   
Furthermore, extraneous factors are constantly impinging on the project setting and 
differentially influencing the experimental and control groups.  Because of difficulties  
such as these, the finding of some of these studies were inconclusive in terms of proving 
impacts and attribution, despite large expenditures on surveys (Bennendijk, 1990:170). 
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And, Hansson adds: 
 
It is almost impossible for this kind of social research, with its long tradition in  
conceiving social relation as just facts to be collected by questionnaires and analyzed  
using statistical methods, to produce socially usable and relevant knowledge on the  
growing complexity and changes in social relations in complex modern or postmodern 
industrial societies.  This kind of social research cannot… produce information on  
social relations that can be interpreted in a historical-cultural context and integrated in  
a reflexive interpretation of the social processes analyzed (Hansson, 1997:186).] 
 
Nonetheless, quantitatively oriented approaches continue to be widely used throughout 
evaluation research.  One 'positivist' approach that emerged during this early 
'conventional' evaluation phase, and which continues to dominate aid evaluation, is 
known as the Logical Framework Approach (LFA).  LFA's notable influence on aid 
evaluation warrants a more detailed accounting of its utility and limits within the aid 
evaluation context – particularly in terms of its ability to address the attribution question. 
 
 
THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK APPROACH: DEFINED, DELINEATED, AND DISMANTLED 
 
Evaluation work should avoid treating a program as a "black box" that automatically 
transforms inputs into outputs and impacts.  This view leaves a huge gap in our 
understanding of why programs succeed or fail. 
 
– Treasury Board of Canada, 7 
 
 
 During the 1950s and 1960s, development agencies adopted a variety of methods 
for predicting the likely impact of an intervention so that they could "approve, adjust, or 
reject it" (Roche, 1999:18).  Emphasis was generally on 'determining the worth of the 
particular project or program' by weighing and comparing the associated costs and 
benefits (Bennendijk, 1990; Treasury Board of Canada, 107).  The most common of these 
approaches include Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), Social Cost-Benefit Analysis (SCBA) 
and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) (Roche, 1999:18).  Even at the end of the 
1970s, cost-benefit approaches were widely accepted, though, as will be shown, not 
without criticism and dissention: 
 
[Social cost-benefit analysis] and related methodologies are sanctioned before us  
as scientific techniques globally applicable - here, there, everywhere.  Concepts  
and data are treated as if they possessed cross-cultural generality, as if they were  
politically and ideologically neutral and theoretically unambiguous (Elzinga,  
1981:5). 
 
It was in 1971 that, drawing on the 1950s 'management by objectives' approach, 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) developed and 
adopted the Logical Framework Approach (LFA) (Wiggins and Shield, 1995).  The 
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Logical Framework Approach was originally defined as, "[a] set of interlocking concepts 
which must be used together in a dynamic fashion to permit the elaboration of a well-
designed, objectively described and evaluable project" (Practical Concepts incorporated, 
1979).  LFA presents a pictorial description of the 'logical' relationship among 
interconnected parts of a particular project or program.  Represented as a four-by-four 
matrix, the Logframe summarizes the hierarchical relationship between program inputs 
('required resources' and 'activities undertaken'), outputs ('specific result upon successful 
implementation'), purpose ('intermediate objectives') and goals ('ultimate development 
impacts').  Additionally, the logframe delineates the assumptions on which the program 
strategy is constructed, and provides an outline of how the project will be evaluated (what 
indicators will be measured and how) (Wiggins and Shields, 1995).  Basil Cracknell 
defines three primary 'functions' of logframe approach: it helps to 'clarify objectives', 
'establish indicators', and 'provide an account of the program's assumptions' (Cracknell, 
2000:108-112).  And, Annette Binnendijk explains the significance of the logical 
framework approach when it was first introduced: 
 
Logframe solved a major evaluation problem by clarifying at the design stage the  
specific development objectives of the project, and how the elements of the project  
were hypothesized to affect those goals" (Binnendijk, 1990:167). 
 
The table below depicts the original logical framework matrix as presented by USAID in 
the early 1970s.  
 







Means of verification 
(MOV) 
Important assumptions 
Goal Measures of Goal 
achievement 
Sources of information 
Method used 
Assumption affecting  
Purpose-Goal linkage 
 





Outputs Magnitudes of outputs  
Planned completion date 





Inputs Nature of level of 
resources  
Necessary cost  
Planned starting date 
Sources of information 
 




Today there exist numerous variants of the original logical framework; Molly den Heyer 
distinguishes between three 'mainstream structures' of logframe: Logical Framework 
Analysis, Program Logic Model, and results Chain (see den Heyer, 2001 for a detailed 
description of each).   
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The logframe's promise to facilitate standardized evaluation practices within 
development research was accompanied by rapid expansion in use.  Internationally, 
government and non-government agencies have since adopted variants of the logframe 
approach; these include the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the 
World bank, the United Nation, the British Overseas Development Commission (ODC), 
and the European Commission (GV VIII), to name a few (Wiggins and Shields, 1995; 
Cracknell, 2000).  And, although the logframe continues to be internationally employed 
as "a tool for conceptualizing the relationships between short term outcomes produced by 
programs, intermediate system impacts and long-term community goals" (Julian 
1997:251), a wave of criticism has brought about a reassessment of the limits of the 
Logical Framework Approach.  
 
Although logframe remains a dominant model for evaluating development 
projects and programs, evaluators have been quick to recognize the limits of and 
problems inherent in this approach (see Gasper, 1998, Carden, 1999; Gasper, 2000).  
Critiques of logframe range from its inflexibility and the unreality of 'logical' 
assumptions, to the inappropriateness and misuse of LFA within complex systems, as 
well as the problems of methodological positivism (Julian, 1997; Cracknell, 2000; 
Pasteur, 2001).   
       
As stated, the utility of the logframe approach lies in its ability to provide a 
guiding summary and overview of a project or program's objectives and intended results.  
This summary is meant to facilitate clarity about what is 'important' and what 'should' 
result from a project or program.  In practice however, what is 'important' may change 
post-intervention, and what 'should' result may in fact be very different from what does 
result.   
 
[L]ogframes are inevitably simplifications, which become dangerous when not  
seen as such; they can help logical thinking, not substitute for it, yet enforcement  
of a fixed format tends to produce illogic; and they are prone to rigidification and  
thus to blocking rather than aiding adaptation (Gasper, 2000:18). 
 
The rigidity (or inflexibility) of the logframe approach is perhaps its most often cited 
criticism (citations).  Kath Pasteur (2001) points out that setting formal indicators is good 
for accountability, but indicators can become the targets themselves.  The pressures of 
accountability may therefore urge evaluators to focus above all on measurement of 
indicators.  In such cases, the logframe process becomes more important than the project 
itself.  Furthermore, emphasis on attributing results to projects or programs through the 
strict adherence to the logical framework structure may produce misleading conclusions.  
That is, the careful measurement of the relations between inputs and outputs, outputs and 
objectives, and objectives and goals may fail to capture meaningful changes (whether 
positive or negative) outside of the logframe.  Indicators (and in some cases objectives) 
set prior to the implementation may change in later stages of the project or program.  
Stakeholders may determine that what was 'important' early on, may not be as the 
situation changes.  Cracknell therefore ask the important question: "What is the point of 
producing elaborate indices if the project is going to continually be changed by the 
wishes of the stakeholders?" (2000, 354). The inflexibility of the logframe approach 
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presents obvious problems for confidently attributing project or program results.  While 
inputs may be accurately measured against outputs, the rigidity of the logframe approach 
is not well suited for attributing development impacts – that is, it does not deal well with 
the indeterminate nature of the long-term development intervention impacts.   
 
This raises a related criticism, namely the inadequacy of the 'inflexible' Logical 
Framework Approach for dealing with complex systems.  Anne Whyte explains that 
logframe "has a formal methodology that is sometimes criticized for being too rigid, 
especially when applied to complex social systems requiring a more flexible, adaptive-
systems approach” (2000:12).  On the nature of the Logical Framework Approach, 
Gasper suggests that:  
 
LFA reflects business and logistics planning of the 1960s, with assumptions of  
relatively well-understood and controllable change, engineered via a 'project' within  
or largely controlled by a single organization.  It centers attention on outputs and  
service delivery and on the achievement of intended effects by intended routes  
(Gasper, 2000:21).   
 
The logframe appears well suited for attributing results of 'simple' interventions within 
'simple' systems (see above).  However, 'comprehensive' interventions within 'complex' 
systems may present problems for the logframe approach.  During an evaluation of 'a 
large, urban United Way', David Julian discovers that "[logframe's] simplicity ignores the 
complex nature of local human services delivery systems and problems" (Julian, 
1997:256).  One factor that limits the utility of the logframe approach is the likelihood of 
unintended consequences associated with complex systems.  The heightened chance for 
unintended consequences within complex systems can have enormous effects on the 
trajectory of a project or program, making attribution a exceedingly difficult task.   
Therefore, for example, the use of logframe within the complex aid evaluation sector 
makes a number of precarious assumptions about the evaluator's ability to account for the 
'unintended' (citation).      
 
To adopt a logframe as a central tool in effects and impacts evaluation assumes that  
we have high powers of foresight, so that neither unforeseen routes nor unintended  
effects are important… Neglect of unintended effects such as externalities (impact  
on group other than the targets) could work for a single-mindedly self-concerned  
organization - but not, for example, for democracy and human rights projects or  
emergency assistance (Gasper, 1998:24).     
 
Finally, logframe's emphasis on quantitative methods for attributing intervention results 
has been strongly criticized (Julian, 1997; Gasper, 1998; Cracknell, 2000; Gasper, 2000; 
Pasteur, 2001).  Aid evaluation has a history of employing logframe models "based on 
the "ideal" of experimental and quasi-experimental research designs, whereby impacts or 
changes in the living standard and behaviors of the project beneficiaries could be 
measured and held attributable to project interventions" (Binnendijk, 1990:168).  
Consequently, logframe within aid evaluation has been susceptible to the various 
problems associated with positivist research on human behavior within complex social 
systems.  These range from operational issues such as sample selection and control 
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groups, internal validity and accurate measurement, to analytical problems.  One of these 
problems is the lack of subjective accounts from program participants in logframe 
studies.  This is not to say that logframe studies ignore the perspectives of 
participants/beneficiaries, but rather that subjective accounts play a minor role.  Perhaps 
the most serious problem associated with positivist research (and the logical framework 
approach particularly) is its potential to neglect the contextual dynamics that are always 
at play within the ‘social’.  That is, the logical framework model has a tendency to 
narrow its field of vision to only those variables that are determined to be ‘logically’ 
related to the outcomes.  As such, by its very design, logframe studies will neglect other, 
possibly unknown, intervening variables.  The implication being, logical framework 
studies often provide only a partial representation of the factors that are responsible for 
observed outcomes.   
 
The utility of the logframe approach within aid evaluation also comes into 
question in the recent Review of Evaluation Resources for Non-Profit Organizations.   
The authors suggest that some organization may in fact be better off avoiding the 
technically challenging data that 'logic models' provide: "Less technical data collection 
methods may, in fact, be more appropriate in the case of many nonprofit sector 
organizations" (Bozzo and Hall, 1999:2).  Nonetheless, the criticisms of logframe within 
complex systems should not be taken as an outright abnegation of this approach.  Rather, 
some suggest that insofar as the logframe approach is "inappropriate for the study of 
these systems… an alternative, methodologically 'pluralistic' approach to this research is 
proposed” (Homer-Dixon, 1996:132).  This has entailed incorporating logframe with 
other approaches that are more sensitive to the distinct characteristics of comprehensive 
interventions within complex systems.  It terms of the potential to demonstrate causal 
relations between interventions and effects – particularly, long-term impacts – the 
Logical Framework Approach has been strongly criticized:  
 
First of all, causality can not be established.  Development projects are often based  
on the assumed causal relationship between inputs, outputs and objectives.  Such  
assumptions are certainly embodied in the Logical Framework Approach.  The logical,  
causal relationship does not exist in real life, development intervention situations,  
however. In reality, constantly changing conditions and almost unpredictable external  
and internal factors are the order of the day, significantly affecting intervention results.   
The assumed casual relationship can therefore hardly be established when evaluating 





Given the diverse and changing nature of aid evaluation, no single model is 
appropriate for all evaluation situations; instead, the variety of models reflects the range 
of research related experiences characteristic of development assistance.  Nonetheless, 
early aid evaluation is dominated by positivist-quantitative models, and, specifically with 
Logical Framework Analysis (LFA).  Designed and most suitable for economic-focused 
interventions, the appeal of LFA rests on its apparent parsimoniousness and the 
assumption of scientific accuracy.  Critics, however, point out that the LFA model may 
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be too rigid, and that if the aim of the evaluation is understanding (for instance, why and 
how things changed), then alone LFA may be inappropriate.  It is important to keep in 
mind that although aid evaluation has a tradition of quantitative research (and, 
specifically, LFA use), as the nature of the profession has transformed so too has its 
research techniques and strategies.  For example, the increased emphasis on governance 
and democracy, institutional learning and capacity building, participation and 
empowerment has meant a shift toward more compatible and appropriate methods of 
evaluation.  So, increasingly one sees LFA models being used in conjunction with more 
qualitative, case-oriented studies.   
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Shifting Paradigms: A Qualitative Turn 
 
Our era is characterized by an epistemological transition… The epistemology of the 
American culture was essentially derived from the Greek-European epistemology based 
on deductive logic, assumptions of one-way causal flow, and hierarchical social order. 
 
    – Muruyama, 1981  
 
From the early 1980's, new methods of inquiry emerged which sought to make people 
and communities subjects and active participants, rather than objects of impact 
assessment. 
 
– Chris Roche, 1999 
 
 
 By the late 1970s, the 'critical mass' of problems associated with 'conventional' 
evaluation helped bring about an epistemological 'turn of tides', accompanied by creative 
alternative models and approaches for conducting evaluation research.  Philosophically, 
the 'logic of unidirectional causality' embodied in 'traditional science' was seen to be 
misguiding (Maruyama, 1981:202).  Moreover, the 'postmodern' atmosphere of the 1980s 
engendered a deep skepticism about the positivist 'promise'; and, new ideas about the 
purpose and limits of evaluation corresponded with new methodologies (see Stake, 
1975).  The shift is manifest in a debate that has been given many labels – the 
positivist/constructivist debate, the objectivist/subjectivist debate, and perhaps most often 
cited, the quantitative/qualitative debate.  In Evaluation: Preview of the Future #2, M.F. 
Smith suggests that this debate endures today, and although it is often shrouded in 
methodological polemics, it "was and is about differences in philosophy and "world 
view" (Smith, 2001:292).  The ensuing discussion explores the attribution question within 
evaluation research from this new 'world view'.  In doing so, it reveals how evaluation 
has evolved, gradually shifting consensus on the roles and limits of the profession.  And, 
it shows that although attribution continues to remain elusive, this 'qualitative turn' may 
in fact provide a better means of addressing impact questions.  Therefore, the following 
emphasizes one side of the debate – the qualitative/constructivist/subjectivist side – in 
order to explicate the relationship between this new 'paradigm' and the specific attribution 
problem.28  Furthermore, it assesses attribution with specific questions in mind: 
 
 Does this shift provide an alternative means for exploring the relationship between 
interventions and impacts?  
 Does this shift represent a move away from attempting to attribute results?  
 
                                                          
28 A full account of the different models that represent this paradigm shift will not be provided here. For 
some of the more well-known representative works, see: Feuerstein's Partners in Evaluation (1986), 
Patton's Qualitative Evaluation Methods, Guba and Lincoln's Fourth Generation Evaluation (1989), 
Fetterman's Empowerment Evaluation (1994), and Pawson and Tilley's Realistic Evaluation (1997).  
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Perhaps the most salient expression of evaluation's shift away from the positivist 
project is Guba and Lincoln's (1989) Fourth Generation Evaluation.  Heavily influenced 
by Robert Stakes' Responsive Evaluation,29 the authors comment that the three preceding 
'generations' (measurement, description, and judgement) represent undue 'managerialism', 
neglect the importance of 'value plurality', and express baseless reverence for the 
'scientific method' (Guba and Lincoln, 1989).  They explain that evaluation has moved 
into a fourth generation.  In essence, this generation is characterized by: the rejection of 
the validity of the scientific method within the human sector; the rejection of the 'ideal' of 
detached, objective research; an embrace of the plurality of values; and, an embrace of 
the participation of all parties involved in evaluation.  Fourth Generation also emphasizes 
negotiation between agents involved in the evaluation – a negotiation concerning the 
course and direction of the evaluation, as well as a negotiation of values and meanings 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1989).  Therefore the role of 'fourth generation' evaluators has 
transformed, from 'detached observer' to 'engaged facilitator'.  Cracknell explain: "[T]he 
evaluator has most of his/her former roles (technician, describer, assessor), but with a 
difference; now he/she has to take on a number of other roles, such as collaborator, 
learner/teacher, reality shaper (catalyst), and mediator or change agent" (Cracknell, 
2000:318).  But perhaps most significantly herein, 'fourth generation' evaluation "was 
aimed at debunking scientific positivism and evaluation's reliance on quantitative data" 
(den Heyer, 2001:48).    
   
During the 1980s and 1990s, evaluation gradually adopted many of the 'fourth 
generation' tenets.  Claus Rebien (1996) explains that 'fourth generation' and 
'participatory evaluation', (both initially termed ‘participatory evaluation’), tend to 
embody very similar philosophical and methodological ideals.  He defines 'participatory 
evaluation' as "as an evaluation process where stakeholders are involved in the design, 
data collection, analysis and use phases of the evaluation.  Stakeholders are defined as 
people working with or being affected by the intervention” (Rebien, 1996:5).  Today, 
evaluation research emphasizing stakeholder involvement has various names including, 
'participatory', 'empowerment', 'transformative' and 'inclusive' evaluation.  Although 
distinct, each holds in common the centrality of stakeholder involvement at all levels (see 
Mark, 2001; Torres and Preskill, 2001)). Furthermore, Elzinga explains the significance 
of the shift toward more participatory, action-focused evaluation: 
 
[It represents] a departure from the traditional method which emphasizes non- 
involvement and justifies it with positivist epistemology.  The action-research  
school for its part criticizes traditional methodology for being extremely unrealistic  
and maintaining a false isolation of evaluation from the project or program being  
evaluated (Elzinga, 1981:40).30  
 
To be sure, while some of the more extreme views engendered in 'fourth 
generation' thinking have been received dubiously (such as the outright rejection of the 
                                                          
29 Among other things, Stakes' 'responsive evaluation' advocated the importance of context, as well as the 
utility of qualitative methods, within evaluation research. 
30 Bozzo and Hall explain that participatory evaluation does have its problems: "The possible down-side of 
the participatory approach is that they are time-consuming, since staff need to allocate time to the process 
and participants may need special guidance to be integrated into the process" (Bozzo and Hall, 1999:4). 
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validity of the scientific method), the movement has been nonetheless influential.  The 
emergence of numerous qualitatively oriented evaluation approaches, and the intense 
scrutiny and critique of quantitative methods during the 1970s and 1980s, corresponded 
with the emergence of participatory focused evaluation (see Stake, 1975; Patton, 1980; 
Feuerstein, 1986; Pawson and Tilley, 1997), and reached its apogee within the 'fourth 
generation' (Cook, 1997:33).  Today, these 'participatory-focused, qualitative-oriented' 
evaluation approaches tend to se subsumed under a common rubric: constructivist 
evaluation.31  As summarized by the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, this new paradigm 
represents a dramatic shift away from 'conventional' evaluation's emphasis on 'proving' 
outcomes:   
 
The primary objective of evaluations based on the assumptions of interpretivism/  
constructivism is to understand social programs from many different perspectives.   
This paradigm focuses on answering questions about process and implementation,  
and what the experiences have meant to those involved.  Therefore, it is well suited to  
helping us understand contextual factors and the complexities of the programs - and  
helping us make decisions about improving project management and delivery  
(W.K Kellogg Foundation, 1998:10). 
 
Oakley, et al. explain, "the search for a more process-oriented, qualitatively sensitive and 
'learning' form of evaluation has been intense and, in theory at least, relatively 
successful" (1998:28).  And, in an in-depth survey of aid evaluation, Kuji-Shikatani 
(1995) finds that "Participatory Evaluation is advocated by the vast majority" (1995:263).  
From an organizational perspective, participatory methods are widely viewed as crucial 
within aid evaluation: "Reengineering calls for a more participatory approach to 
evaluation, involving customers, partners and stakeholders – as appropriate – in all 
phases of the evaluation process" (USAID, 1997:3).   
 
Methodologies associated with 'constructivist evaluation' are qualitative in the 
main.  They generally emphasize thorough, detailed understanding of a situation, but do 
not require quantification.  Creswell (1994) explains that: 
 
In a qualitative methodology inductive logic prevail.  Categories emerge from  
informants, rather than are identified a priori by the researcher.  This emergence  
provides rich 'context-bound' information leading to patterns or theories that help  
explain a phenomenon.  The question about the accuracy of the information may  
not surface in a study, or, if it does, the researcher talks about steps for verifying  
the information with informants or 'triangulating' among different sources of  
information (Dale, 1998:109). 
 
Common qualitative methods include in-depth and semi-structured interviews, focus 
groups, open-ended surveys and questionnaires, and textual analysis.  A more elaborate 
and often more fruitful qualitative methods is the case study (Stake, 1978; Datta, 1997; 
House, 2001; Stake, 2001).  House (2001) suggest that all 'knowledge is situation, and 
                                                          
31 See Pawson and Tilley's Realistic Evaluation (1997) for view similar to the constructivists, but one that 
"differs from the idealism held by some constructivists who deny that there is any reality apart from our 
interpretations" (Henry et. al, 1998:4).    
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contextually bound', therefore the researcher must become intimate with and sensitive to 
the program's setting if she/he is to understand it.32 The case study, which may involve a 
number of techniques ranging from participant observation to textual analysis, provides a 
means to this end.  Robert Stake offers the following description of the case study:  
 
"[M]ost case studies feature: descriptions that are complex, holistic, and involving  
a myriad of not highly isolated variables; data that are likely to be gathered at least  
partly by personalistic observation; and a writing style that is informal, perhaps  
narrative, possibly with verbatim quotations, illustration, and even allusion and  
metaphor.  Comparisons are implicit rather than explicit (Stake, 1978:7). 
 
The case study (as well as other qualitative approaches) represents a sharp turn away 
from the ideals of detached objectivity, quantitative measurement, and causal explanation 
which is embodied in 'conventional' evaluation.  It endorses a kind of evaluation that is 
interested in generating meaningful interpretations of contextually bound, often highly 
complex, situations.33  Stake also reminds us of the "need for explicating special contexts, 
not neutralizing them as error effects" (2001:352).  Consequently, the situational 
knowledge that emerges through these approaches tends to be perceived as ill suited for 
the kinds of analyses that can generate causal explication.  Moreover, qualitative 
evaluation has carried the unfavorable reputation of being "an imprecise, ill-focused, 
descriptive, inductive exercise, strong on vicarious experiences, but chronically at risk of 
failed credibility in the eye of the people who count [sic]" (Shaw, 1999:123); a reputation 
that has helped to keep it at the margins of 'mainstream' evaluation.  This, however, is 
changing.  In response to the concern that case studies present data validity problems, 
House offers the following simple answer:  
 
Since the evaluator relies on impressions and 'personalistic' observation and not  
on standard data collection and analysis techniques, how does one keep from being  
wrong?  The major way is to try out the ideas on people in the setting.  Let them  
respond to what the evaluator has written and challenge it… allowing others  
freedom to disagree, even encouraging them to do so.  Evaluators should admit  
their fallibility and make this known to stakeholders and audiences (House, 2001:26). 
 
Moreover, as has been shown, attributing change to a single intervention is particularly 
difficult within aid evaluation; a confluence of factors (both other initiatives and 
unknown, uncontrollable conditions) may obfuscate relationship between interventions 
and effects.  Given this characteristic of aid evaluation, the case study may in fact be a 
better option. Exposing the detailed contexts within which interventions are implemented 
and carried out may help to disentangle the web of extraneous variables commonly found 
within 'complex' systems: 
 
The existence of multiple initiatives in a given community makes it difficult to  
                                                          
32 "To understand a program one must travel into the program setting in the deeper sense to see where 
people live and how they think.  Their beliefs and judgements should be included in the report even if the 
evaluator does not agree with them, perhaps especially if the evaluator disagrees" (House, 2001:25).  
33 It should be noted that, when using case studies the researcher must strike "the appropriate balance 
between random sampling among projects and programs versus purposive sampling, or "cherry-picking"" 
(Ryan, 2002:8).     
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determine which effort is responsible for results. Although the varied role of  
community factors in comprehensive initiatives makes it hard for evaluators to  
generalize findings across communities, incorporating community context into  
an understanding of local interventions helps researchers recognize the idiosyncratic  
nature of comprehensive services (Anne E. Cassie, 1995). 
 
Other evaluators argue that qualitative methods are in fact quite amenable to causal 
explanations.  Lawrence Mohr's (1999) offers a strategy for inferring causation through 
qualitative data (see above); and, Ian Shaw's Qualitative Evaluation (1999), suggests that 
"[w]ith regards to outcomes and causality, …qualitative evaluation provides a better fit 
for evaluation purposes because it attends to micro-processes, local theory, and 
contextual variables" (Kaminsky, 2000:334).  Additionally, the success of qualitative 
evaluation is also evidenced in its growing practical application and acceptance.  Oakley, 
et al., summarize the findings of a mixed method (combined quantitative and qualitative) 
study conducted by in Nepal by ACTIONAID:  
 
[T]he quantitative studies provided information on outcomes but not impact.  The  
impact data was obtained from the qualitative study which showed the felt and  
observed changes in the quality of life.  They concluded that possibly only qualitative  





Qualitative methods, therefore, offer an alternative means of establishing causal 
explanations, one in which 'certainty of attribution' – typically derived through 
quantification and statistical manipulation – is exchanged for a well corroborated, 'deep 
understanding' of what changed and why.  In effect, the qualitative approach offers a new 
understanding of attribution within aid evaluation; rather than it implying the effect 
caused by a specific, isolated variable, attribution is sought through the in-depth study of 
the relationships between numerous variables that together affect change.  In doing so, 
they also offer a potential remedy to the attribution problem, one that involves redefining 
the role and goals of the evaluation.  Like the disunity within the social sciences, 
evaluation has struggled over its ultimate role and goals.  The movement toward a more 
interpretivist approach has helped to redefine the roles and goals of evaluation research 





The Road Ahead: Recommendations & Cautions  
 
The relationship of evaluation research to data-analytic techniques is both complex and 
opaque: The clarification of this relationship is important not only for 'applied' social 
scientists but for policy maker’s program personnel. 
– Manfred Kuchler, 1981 
 
There is no agreement among agencies or academics about the best way of evaluating 
aid.  Different approaches are used by different agencies and a change in approach often 
occurs from one evaluation to the next. 
 
– Claus Rebien, 1996 
 
There is no one ideal design for an evaluation or research study.  All studies involve 
compromises in the light of on-the-ground circumstances and the realities of resource 
constraints.  To obtain results as accurate as possible, given the available time and 
funding, many trade-offs are made… 
 
– Anne Whyte, 2000 
 
 To review, the problems associated with attributing precise changes to specific aid 
interventions are many and varied; nonetheless, the growing demand by donors for 
accountability has meant increased pressure to demonstrate results.  For aid evaluators, 
this often means employing strategies that promise empirically grounded results and 
relationships.  In such situations, the prevalence of logframe approaches and quantitative 
methods may have less to do with epistemological superiority than with the depth of its 
roots in tradition.  As has been illustrated, a history deeply entrenched in the ideals of 
positivism has resulted in the perception that attribution can only be 'validly' determined 
through quantitative measurement and experimental/quasi-experimental designs. This 
view was critically challenged during the late 1970s and early 1980s, resulting in what 
has been referred to as a 'paradigm shift' within evaluation research.  In addition to an 
acute skepticism toward the potential and limits of the 'scientific method', emphasis 
shifted toward 'value plurality' through stakeholder participation and 'empowerment', 
underscoring the need to comprehend and incorporate 'context' within evaluation.  In 
essence, it marked a move away from the 'box-filling' evaluation that characterized the 
previous era.  This has been particularly important within the field of aid evaluation 
wherein the 'complex' nature of this sector, as well as the 'comprehensive' character of its 
interventions, make measuring attribution highly difficult; and, in which accurate 
explanations of long term impact and change are best achieved through meaningful, 
contextual understanding. 
 
In terms of attribution, two concurrent sets of circumstances appear to be guiding 
evaluation's course.  On the one hand, aid evaluation has increasingly adopted more 
qualitative methods of inquiry, emphasizing understanding over measuring.  But at the 
same time, funding concerns associated with development projects have meant increased 
demand by donors for accountability, renewing an urgency to attribute results to projects.  
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Therefore, "although evaluation methods have evolved considerably… they are still 
heavily influenced by the need to measure performance for accountability purposes" 
(Whyte, 2000).  To shed light on this apparent contradiction, several thematically related 
areas will be discussed. The present status of the quantitative/qualitative debate will be 
linked to the increasing use of multiple, mixed methodologies within aid evaluation.  
Secondly, the changing conceptualization of 'causation' within evaluation research will be 
discussed; and, finally the growing interest in and concern over the role of advocacy 




The contemporary literature presents a picture of the quantitative/qualitative 
debate as a 'quiet front' wherein, if not altogether resolved, a 'friendly truce' has been 
established (Greene, 2001; House, 2001; Pawson and Tilley, 2001).  Evidence of 
qualitative research's achievements can be found in the numerous 'successful' qualitative 
evaluations within the literature.  In Daniel Stufflebeam's monograph, Evaluation 
Models, twenty-two evaluation approaches ranging from 'objective testing programs' and 
'performance measurement' to 'program-theory based studies', 'mixed-methods studies', 
and 'client centered studies' are described and assessed (Stufflebeam, 2001).  Most of the 
approaches that made Stufflebeam's 'best list' are highly amenable to qualitative methods: 
 
When compared with professional standards for program evaluations, the best  
approaches are decision/accountability, utilization-based, client centered, consumer 
-oriented, case study, deliberative democratic, constructivist, accreditation, and 
outcome/value-added assessment… The worst bets were found to be politically  
controlled, public relations, accountability (especially payment by results),  
clarification hearings, and program-theory based approaches (Stufflebeam, 2001:89)    
 
Additionally, he concludes that, "clearly approaches are showing a strong orientation 
toward stakeholder involvement and use of multiple methods" (Stufflebeam, 2001:89). 
 
As has been explained, the 'qualitative turn' did much to enhance evaluation 
research.  Particularly, it recognized the significance of 'situational, context-bound 
knowledge', it strengthened the role of stakeholders, and it promoted a deeper 
understanding of the ways that people and programs interact within unique setting.  The 
adoption of a multiple methodological approach for conducting evaluation research 
emerged out of this 'paradigm shift'.  The trend toward multiple methods seems to have 
been borne out of the realization that no single method is able to provide the full picture 
of the relationship between interventions and changes.   
 
There is no single correct evaluation design for impact evaluations. The goal is  
to come up with the best design possible under the circumstances. Almost all  
designs represent a compromise dictated by many practical considerations such  
as how much money and time are available, what the client considers compelling,  
how much a design might interfere with the normal operation of the program, and  
so on (HRDC, 1998). 
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Accordingly, more and more evaluators have become convinced that the 'best design 
possible' involves multiple methods.  To be sure, the frequency of multiple method use 
within evaluation has risen dramatically in recent years.  This has been particularly 
important for 'complex' evaluation sectors, and for evaluating at the 'comprehensive' 
program levels (such as, for aid evaluation).  Homer-Dixon's (1996) assessment of the 
problems associated with evaluating within 'complex ecological-political systems' 
reiterates the importance of multiple methods.  He suggest that many of the commonly 
adopted methods "are inappropriate for the study of these systems, and an alternative, 
methodologically “pluralistic” approach to this research is proposed” (Homer-Dixon, 
1996:132).  To be sure, the call for multiple methods is not new.  Within the social 
sciences generally there has been an emphasis on 'triangulating methods' – on the one 
hand, to reinforce the validity of qualitative findings, and on the other, to enrich 
quantitative results.  Robert Stake's Responsive Evaluation emphasized the importance of 
involving more than one type of method for any single evaluation.  House summarizes:     
 
The greatest strength of responsive evaluation is that it helped break the intellectual 
stranglehold that single-method approaches had on evaluation at one time.  It  
legitimated different avenues to conducting evaluations.  This influence was liberating  
and highly beneficial as evaluation evolved into a multimethod professional practice.   
Stake's responsive evaluation played a major role in expanding the field intellectually  
(House, 2001:26). 
 
Multiple methods are particularly effective because they are capable of answering a range 
of different questions within a variety of settings. As such, they help to reconcile the 
'inadequacies' of any single method; and, when data from multiple methods are 
triangulated, findings can be corroborated or contradicted, strengthening validity and 
credibility.  Consequently, evaluation research has been quick to adopt the mixed 
methods approach.  As Basil Cracknell explains:  
 
Most people now accept that the pluralist approach is the right one that is, the use of a 
number of different techniques and methods, is the right one, as may seem appropriate  
rather than just focusing on one (2000:350). 
 
Notably, the widespread use of multiple methods may be evidence that the quantitative/ 
qualitative debate is all but over – in practice, if not in theory (Mark, 2001).  
 
 
A CHANGING CONCEPTION OF ‘CAUSATION’ 
 
The growing acceptance and use of multiple methodologies within evaluation 
research is linked to the discipline's changing (albeit gradually) conceptualization of 
'causation'.  On the one hand, there seems to be a change in the 'standard of evidence' by 
which evaluator's 'measure' the effects of interventions.  Notably, where 'proof' of 
attribution is required, the means of establishing it may not necessarily follow 
'conventional' methods.  Increasingly, evaluators are adopting mixed methods to 'reduced 
uncertainty' and generate 'reasonable confidence' as a satisfactory substitute for 'statistical 
significance' alone.  And, they appear to regard the loss in statistical rigor as outweighed 
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by the gain in understanding of 'which programs work', 'what parts of which programs 
work', 'why they worked', and 'in what contexts'.  John Mayne explains:  
 
Measurement in the public sector is less about precision and more about increasing  
understanding and knowledge.  It is about increasing what we know about what works  
in an area and thereby reducing uncertainty… We need to include softer and qualitative  
measurement tools in our concept of measurement in the public sector (Mayne, 1999:5). 
 
Additionally, he suggests that, "[w]e need to accept the fact that what we are doing is 
measuring with the aim of reducing the uncertainty about the contribution made, not 
proving the contribution made" (Mayne, 1999: 16).34  Albeit, this may not represent a 
change in the conceptualization of causation so much as a new standard for determining 
the relationship between intervention and impact.  
 
Evaluation's notion of causation is changing in other ways too.  Recall that, since 
causation per se is not possible (see 'Causation: Background and Terms'), it has been used 
within evaluation to refer instead to 'probabilistic causation' (i.e., correlation) determined 
through quantitative analysis.  As such, its strongest feature is its ability to establish 
'generalizations' from large quantities of information involving a relatively small, 
'controlled' set of variables.  Qualitative research, on the other hand, is interested in the 
'particularities' of a relatively small number of cases.  In this sense, the quantitative/ 
qualitative debate has represented a struggle of values, between the 'ideal' of 
generalization and the 'ideal' of particularization.35  As much as qualitative research has 
been applauded for recognizing the importance of the particularities of context, the 
quantitative research ideal of generalization endures.  And, insofar as generalizability 
remains an integral feature of most evaluation research, the question resounds: How does 
one generalize from the particularities of qualitative data? The response to this question 
may be found in evaluation synthesis.  Cracknell explains: 
 
In then early days of evaluation activity most of the evaluations were of individual  
projects.  But it was soon found that these were of little value…because it was not  
possible to draw inferences of a general nature from only one project …So it  
became the practice to 'cluster' projects by sector, and then to produce 'syntheses'  
of the findings, on the principle that if the same finding recurred in several places  
it was justifiable to draw a broad conclusion with some confidence (Cracknell,  
2000:199)   
 
The emergence of evaluation synthesis therefore helped make single project 
evaluations more useful, and provided a new means by which evaluators might 
'confidently' generalize from the 'particularities' of qualitative data (see also Lipsey, 2001; 
Pawson and Tilley, 2001; Patton, 2001).   Ernest House (2001) suggests three additional 
avenues for 'reducing uncertainty' when evaluating the specific effects of a particular 
                                                          
34 Explaining 'contribution analysis', Mayne asks whether "a reasonable person, knowing what has occurred 
in the program and that the intended outcomes actually occurred, agrees that the program contributed to 
those outcomes?" (Mayne, 1999:7). 
35 Interestingly, Robert Stake (2001) suggests that "[a]ny evaluation can be thought of as a case-study, 
given the peculiarities of the program implementation and context" (Mark, 2001:461). 
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program: the case study, meta-evaluation, and program theory.  He explains that each 
approach "takes account of the more complex social reality by framing the program and 
the study more precisely, albeit, in different ways" (House, 2001:312). Indeed this marks 
a shift away from the conception of causation that is based on 'robust dependence' or 
'sequential manipulation'.36  Whether it is more or less valid ultimately depends of the 
methodological vigilance that the evaluator brings to bear upon the study.    But on the 
issue of 'causation' within evaluation, House is adamant: "[Causation] remains 
incomplete, unfinished business for the field, except to say that we do understand that 
social causation is more complex than we thought back in the old days" (House, 
2001:312).37  
 
A final noteworthy development in aid evaluation is the shift in emphasis from 
evaluation set on 'proving', to evaluation focused on 'improving'.  Astutely aware of the 
epistemological and methodological limits inherent in all research involving complex 
human/social systems, it appears as though aid evaluators are beginning to redirect the 
aim of their discipline, as well as their role as evaluators.    
 
[T]he intended "impact" of the program is its guiding light and directional beacon,  
not the yardstick against which it is measured.  Thus the threat of failing to discover  
"hidden attribution" is eliminated when feedback on performance concentrates on  
improving rather than on proving, on understanding rather than on reporting, on  
creating knowledge rather than on taking credit (Smutylo, 2001:5). 
 
To be sure, evaluation's emphasis on 'improving' programs is not new, but for aid 
evaluation the ongoing threat of a 'drying well' at home has meant deepening concern 
with improving programs abroad.  Consequently, more organizations appear to be 
adopting this view, and are directing their research agendas toward 'improving' programs 
and result over 'proving' cause and effect: 
 
We also believe that evaluation should not be conducted simply to prove that  
the project worked, but also to improve the way it works.  Therefore, do not view  
evaluation only as an accountability measuring stick imposed on projects, but  
rather as a management and learning tool for projects, for the Foundation,  
and for practitioners in the field who can benefit from the experiences of other  
projects (W.K Kellogg Foundation, 1998:3). 
 
But, the emphasis on improving has once again raised the specter 'objectivity-
subjectivity' within evaluation research.  The 'constructivist' skepticism has corresponded 
with an increased interest in 'advocacy'.  And, although it is not the aim of this paper to 
'evaluate the evaluator', it ends with a word of warning from Robert Stake:  
 
                                                          
36 Evaluation synthesis may involve examining qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods evaluation, 
therefore increasing confidence through a kind of 'meta-triangulation'.  
37 The 'old days' to which House is referring was a time when evaluators believed that: "One may 
formulate an evaluation project in terms of a series of hypotheses which state that 'Activities A, 
B, C will produce results X, Y, Z'" (Suchman, 1967:93). 
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Now, with postmodern insight, validity is methodologically unimportant, epistemology 
destabilized.  Without the backing of the positivist authority, we evaluators are caught  
in the web of advocacy and have become unwitting, sometimes unwillingly, simply a  





One of evaluation’s strongest assets has been its ability to change and grow in 
response to perceived limitations and to the evolving ‘business’ of professional 
evaluation.  The themes of transformation and adaptation throughout its history reflect 
evaluation’s flexibility.  While quantitative research dominated early evaluation, the 
successes of qualitative projects did not go un-noticed or unappreciated, leading to a 
‘friendly truce’ within the quantitative-qualitative debate, and to an increased support of 
mixed-methods approaches.  Perhaps the most significant changes that evaluation has 
undergone in recent years have been the shifts toward understanding, and the move away 
from ‘proving’ and toward ‘improving’.  The recognition of the problematic nature of 
attribution has engendered a shift in the conception of causation away from proving 
relationships between variable, and toward reducing uncertainty about how things relate 
and change.  These changes have been considerable for evaluation generally, and for aid 




The preceding literature review provides a historically grounded account of the 
issues and concerns associated with attributing results within aid evaluation research.  By 
chronicling the evolution of evaluation research it has explained the context in which the 
‘attribution question’ has emerged and changed over the last several decades.  And, it has 
uncovered and critically examined the assumptions that underlie those dominant 
evaluation theories and practices that have claimed to satisfy the attribution question.  In 
sum, it reveals the problems associated with traditional conceptions of causation within 
evaluation research, and it outlines constructive responses.  It has shown how early 
models and approaches tended to employ positivist-quantitative research methods and 
represented a ‘top-down’ philosophy for administering and evaluating aid.  At the heart 
of this approach is the Logical Framework Analysis model, which, although ubiquitous 
within the field, has been subjected to harsh criticism.  Particularly, it has a reputation for 
being ‘inflexible’ when organizing and analyzing social phenomena, and for neglecting 
the dynamic and complex character of social life.  Essentially, the ‘early model’ 
approaches have recognizable limitations.  In response, evaluation research began to 
adopt some of the methods of qualitative social scientific researchers.  By doing so, one 
sees the emphasis on attribution shift, as the ‘business’ of evaluation increasingly 
advocates ‘understanding’.  Still, the utility of quantitative approaches are recognized; 
thus, recent years have witnessed the rise of mixed-methods research.  By employing 
multiple methods evaluators do more than strengthen reliability, they broaden the depth 
and range of understanding of the changes associated with interventions.  Stimulating this 
shift toward mix-method evaluation are philosophical changes in the purpose and 
function of evaluation.  This is particularly germane within aid evaluation where 
understanding complex systems requires ‘partnership’, ‘empowerment’, ‘good-
governance, and ‘capacity building’ – central tenets for modern aid evaluators.  By 
highlighting the changes and the lessons learned over the short history of evaluation 
research, this review provides a backdrop for better understanding the ‘attribution 
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